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INTRODUCTION 
 “Jane” allowed her ex-boyfriend to photograph her naked 
because, as he assured her, it would be for his eyes only.1  After 
their breakup, he betrayed her trust.2  On a popular “revenge porn” 
site, he uploaded her naked photo along with her contact 
information.3  Jane received e-mails, calls, and Facebook friend 
requests from strangers, many of whom wanted sex.4 
According to the officers, nothing could be done because her ex 
had not violated her state’s criminal harassment law.5  One post was 
an isolated event, not a harassing course of conduct as required by 
the law.6  Also, her ex had not threatened her or solicited others to 
stalk her.7  If Jane’s ex had secretly photographed her, he might 
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 1. One of us (Citron) spoke to “Jane” just after the post appeared online. 
Telephone Interview with “Jane” (May 7, 2013) [hereinafter Interview with 
Jane] (notes on file with Danielle Citron); Danielle Keats Citron, “Revenge 
Porn” Should Be a Crime, CNN (Jan. 16, 2014, 3:49 PM), http://www.cnn.com 
/2013/08/29/opinion/citron-revenge-porn/ (discussing Jane’s experience). 
 2. Interview with Jane, supra note 1. 
 3. Id. 
 4. Id. 
 5. Id. 
 6. Id. 
 7. Id. 
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have faced prosecution for publishing the illegally obtained image.8  
In her state, however, it was legal to publish Jane’s naked photo 
taken with her consent even though her consent was premised on 
the promise the photo would remain private.9 
Nonconsensual pornography10 involves the distribution of 
sexually graphic images of individuals without their consent.  This 
includes images originally obtained without consent (e.g., hidden 
recordings or recordings of sexual assaults) as well as images 
originally obtained with consent, usually within the context of a 
private or confidential relationship (e.g., images consensually given 
to an intimate partner who later distributes them without consent, 
popularly referred to as “revenge porn”).  Because the term “revenge 
porn” is used so frequently as shorthand for all forms of 
nonconsensual pornography, we will use it interchangeably with 
nonconsensual porn. 
Publishing Jane’s nude photo without her consent was an 
egregious privacy violation that deserves criminal punishment.  
Criminalizing privacy invasions is not new.  In their 
groundbreaking article The Right to Privacy, published in 1890, 
Samuel Warren and Louis Brandeis argued that “[i]t would 
doubtless be desirable that the privacy of the individual should 
receive the added protection of the criminal law.”11 
Over the past hundred years, state and federal legislators have 
taken Warren and Brandeis’s advice and criminalized many privacy 
invasions.  The Privacy Act of 1974 includes criminal penalties for 
the disclosure of agency records containing individually identifiable 
information to any person or agency not entitled to receive it.12  
Federal laws against identity theft criminalize, inter alia, the 
transfer or use of another person’s means of identification in 
connection with any state felony or violation of federal law.13  
Federal laws prohibit the wrongful disclosure of individually 
identifiable health information.14  The federal Video Voyeurism 
Prevention Act of 2004 bans intentionally recording or broadcasting 
an image of another person in a state of undress without that 
 
 8. Id. 
 9. Id. 
 10. Nonconsensual pornography is also sometimes referred to as “revenge 
porn,” “cyber rape,” or “involuntary porn.” 
 11. Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. 
L. REV. 193, 219 (1890).  Warren and Brandeis noted that possible criminal 
legislation could punish as a felony the publication of “any statement 
concerning the private life or affairs of another, after being requested in 
writing . . . not to publish such statement” provided the statement does not 
concern someone’s qualifications for public office or profession or involve a 
matter of public interest.  Id. at 219 n.8. 
 12. See 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(i)(1) (2012). 
 13. See generally 18 U.S.C. § 1028 (2012). 
 14. See 42 U.S.C. § 1320d-6 (2012). 
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person’s consent under circumstances in which the person enjoys a 
reasonable expectation of privacy.15  Many state voyeurism laws 
criminalize the viewing or recording of a person’s intimate parts 
without permission.16 
 Why, then, are there so few laws banning nonconsensual 
pornography to date?  A combination of factors is at work: lack of 
understanding about the gravity, scope, and dynamics of the 
problem; historical indifference and hostility to women’s autonomy; 
inconsistent conceptions of contextual privacy; and 
misunderstandings of First Amendment doctrine. 
 Revenge porn victims have only recently come forward to 
describe the grave harms they have suffered, including stalking, loss 
of professional and educational opportunities, and psychological 
damage.  As with domestic violence and sexual assault, victims of 
revenge porn suffer negative consequences for speaking out, 
including the risk of increased harm.17  We are only now beginning 
to get a sense of how large the problem of revenge porn is now that 
brave, outspoken victims have opened a space for others to tell their 
stories.18  The fact that nonconsensual porn so often involves the 
Internet and social media, the public, law enforcement, and the 
judiciary sometimes struggle to understand the mechanics of the 
conduct and the devastation it can cause. 
Our society has a poor track record in addressing harms that 
take women and girls as their primary targets.  Though much 
progress has been made towards gender equality, much social, legal, 
and political power remains in the hands of men.  The fight to 
recognize domestic violence, sexual assault, and sexual harassment 
as serious issues has been long and difficult, and the tendency to 
tolerate, trivialize, or dismiss these harms persists.19  As revenge 
 
 15. 18 U.S.C. § 1801.  This statute’s definition of “capture” includes 
“broadcasting,” which suggests that it could be used to apply to the 
nonconsensual disclosure of such images.  However, the statute’s jurisdiction is 
very limited, confined to the “the special maritime and territorial jurisdiction of 
the United States.”  Id. 
 16. See, e.g., DANIEL J. SOLOVE & PAUL M. SCHWARTZ, PRIVACY LAW 
FUNDAMENTALS (2d ed. 2013); Nat’l Ctr. for Prosecution of Child Abuse, 
Voyeurism Statutes 2009, NAT’L DIST. ATTORNEYS ASS’N (Mar. 2009), 
http://www.ndaa.org/pdf/voyeurism_statutes_mar_09.pdf. 
 17. See, e.g., Annmarie Chiarini, I Was a Victim of Revenge Porn. I Don’t 
Want Anyone Else to Face This, THEGUARDIAN (Nov. 19, 2013, 7:30 AM), 
http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2013/nov/19/revenge-porn-victim-
maryland-law-change; Holly Jacobs, Victims of Revenge Porn Deserve Real 
Change, THEGUARDIAN (October 8, 2013, 7:30 AM), http://www.theguardian.com 
/commentisfree/2013/oct/08/victims-revenge-porn-deserve-protection. 
 18. See, generally, Chiarini, supra note 17; Jacobs, supra note 17. 
 19. Danielle Keats Citron, Law’s Expressive Value in Combating Cyber 
Gender Harassment, 108 MICH. L. REV. 373, 392–95 (2009); Mary Anne Franks, 
How to Feel like a Woman, or Why Punishment Is a Drag, 61 UCLA L. REV. 566, 
569–72, 580–84 (2014). 
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porn affects women and girls far more frequently than men and 
boys, and creates far more serious consequences for them, the 
eagerness to minimize its harm is sadly predictable. 
 This disregard for harms undermining women’s autonomy is 
closely tied to idiosyncratic, dangerous views about consent with 
regard to sex.  Some argue that a woman’s consensual sharing of 
sexually explicit photos with a trusted confidant should be taken as 
wide-ranging permission to share them with the public.20  Said 
another way, a victim’s consent in one context is taken as consent 
for other contexts.  That is the same kind of dangerous mentality at 
work in sexual assault and sexual harassment.  For years, women 
have had to struggle with legal and social disregard of their sexual 
boundaries.  While most people today would rightly recoil at the 
suggestion that a woman’s consent to sleep with one man can be 
taken as consent to sleep with all of his friends, this is the very logic 
of revenge porn apologists. 
Outside of sexual practices, most people recognize that consent 
is context-specific.  Privacy regulation and best practices make clear 
that permitting an entity to use information in one context does not 
confer consent to use it in another context without the subject’s 
permission.21  Individual and societal expectations of privacy are 
tailored to specific circumstances.22  The nonconsensual sharing of 
an individual’s intimate photos should be no different; consent 
within a trusted relationship does not equal consent outside of that 
relationship.  We should no more blame individuals for trusting 
loved ones with intimate images than we blame someone for 
trusting a financial advisor not to share sensitive information with 
strangers on the street. 
While some of the First Amendment concerns regarding 
antirevenge porn laws are valid, many of them reflect the tendency 
to treat sexual autonomy, especially women’s sexual autonomy, as a 
 
 20. Lara Prendergast, Revenge Porn’s Ukip Poster Girl Highlights the 
Dangers of Digital Media, SPECTATOR (Apr. 28, 2014, 3:00 PM), 
http://blogs.spectator.co.uk/coffeehouse/2014/04/revenge-porns-new-poster-girl-
highlights-the-dangers-of-digital-media/ (arguing that if individuals share nude 
images of themselves they are doing it “with the knowledge that it may one day 
end up online”); Callie Millner, Public Humiliation over Private Photos, 
SFGATE, http://www.sfgate.com/opinion/article/Public-humiliation-over-private-
photos-4264155.php (last updated Feb. 10, 2013) (quoting revenge porn site 
operator as saying, “When you take a nude photograph of yourself and you send 
it to this other person, or when you allow someone to take a nude photograph of 
you, by your very actions you have reduced your expectation of privacy”). 
 21. See generally sources cited supra note 19 (discussing privacy 
regulations). 
 22. See generally HELEN NISSENBAUM, PRIVACY IN CONTEXT 129 (2010); 
DANIEL J. SOLOVE, THE FUTURE OF REPUTATION (2007) [hereinafter SOLOVE, 
FUTURE OF REPUTATION]; DANIEL J. SOLOVE, UNDERSTANDING PRIVACY 47 (2008) 
[hereinafter SOLOVE, UNDERSTANDING PRIVACY]; Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, A 
Social Networks Theory of Privacy, 72 U. CHI. L. REV. 919, 923–25 (2005). 
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category less deserving of respect than other social values.  As 
scholars like Frederick Schauer23 and Neil Richards24 have pointed 
out, many regulations of speech and expression proceed without any 
strident First Amendment objections, including fraud, trade secrets, 
and product labeling. 
In this Article we make the case for the direct criminalization of 
nonconsensual pornography.  Current civil law remedies, including 
copyright remedies, are an ineffective deterrent to revenge porn. If 
they were, we would likely not be witnessing the rise in reports of 
victimization as well as the proliferation in revenge porn websites.  
According to attorney Mitchell Matorin, who has represented 
revenge porn victims, “In the real world, civil lawsuits are no 
remedy at all.”25  Among the reasons that civil litigation is 
ineffective is the fact that even a successful suit cannot stop the 
spread of an image already disclosed, and most disclosers know they 
are unlikely ever to be sued.  Most victims do not have either the 
time or money to bring claims, and litigation may make little sense 
even for those who can afford to sue if perpetrators have few assets.  
While perpetrators may have little fear of civil litigation or 
copyright claims, the threat of criminal penalties is a different 
matter.  Since criminal convictions in most cases stay on one’s 
record forever, they are much less likely to be ignored.  While some 
existing criminal laws can be mobilized against revenge porn, on the 
whole, existing criminal laws simply do not effectively address the 
issue. 
Criminalizing nonconsensual pornography is also appropriate 
and necessary to convey the proper level of social condemnation for 
this behavior.  Given that a response from the criminal justice 
system is essential, we hope to help lawmakers interested in 
drafting such laws.  We offer our suggestions for drafting revenge 
porn legislation that would comport with the First Amendment and 
Due Process concerns. 
This Article will unfold as follows.  Part I responds to faulty 
assumptions that have obscured a full view of the damage that 
revenge pornography inflicts.  It corrects misunderstandings about 
consent that have prevented us from criminalizing revenge porn.  
Part II explores why civil law alone cannot effectively address 
nonconsensual pornography.  Part III assesses the criminal law 
 
 23. See Frederick Schauer, The Boundaries of the First Amendment: A 
Preliminary Exploration of Constitutional Salience, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1765, 
176774 (2004). 
 24. See Neil Richards, Reconciling Data Privacy and the First Amendment, 
52 UCLA L. REV. 1149, 1171 (2005). 
 25. See Mitchell A. Matorin, In the Real World, Revenge Porn is Far Worse 
Than Making It Illegal, TPM (Oct. 18, 2013, 6:00 AM), 
http://talkingpointsmemo.com/cafe/our-current-law-is-completely-inadequate-
for-dealing-with-revenge-porn. 
W05_CITRON  (DO NOT DELETE) 5/19/2014  11:01 AM 
350 WAKE FOREST LAW REVIEW [Vol. 49 
landscape.  It discusses the deficits of current criminal law.  Then, it 
considers current legislative proposals to prohibit revenge porn.  
Part IV responds to First Amendment concerns.  Part V offers our 
recommendations. 
I.  MYTHS ABOUT REVENGE PORN 
This Part has two objectives.  The first is to debunk the notion 
that the harm revenge porn inflicts is trivial.  Lawmakers are 
unlikely to mobilize against nonconsensual pornography without a 
full appreciation of its harms.  The second goal is to tackle society’s 
current inability to understand the contextual nature of consent 
when it comes to matters of sexual privacy and autonomy.  Privacy 
law and scholarship has recognized the importance of context in 
evaluating consent, and social norms reflect this insight.  The same 
should be true for matters of intimate sexual conduct. 
A. Understanding Revenge Porn’s Damage 
In 2007, a man allegedly made numerous copies of DVDs of his 
ex-girlfriend performing sex acts and distributed them on random 
car windshields, along with the woman’s name, address, and phone 
number.26  He was angry that the woman had broken off their 
relationship.27  The woman, who had not known that the intimate 
acts had been recorded, began receiving visits and phone calls from 
strange men who took the video as a sexual proposition.28 
Today, intimate photos are increasingly being distributed 
online, potentially reaching thousands, even millions of people, with 
a click of a mouse.  A person’s nude photo can be uploaded to a 
website where thousands of people can view and repost it.  In short 
order, the image can appear prominently in a search of the victim’s 
name.  It can be e-mailed or otherwise exhibited to the victim’s 
family, employers, coworkers, and friends.  The Internet provides a 
staggering means of amplification, extending the reach of content in 
unimaginable ways. 
Revenge porn’s serious consequences warrant its 
criminalization.  Nonconsensual pornography raises the risk of 
offline stalking and physical attack.  In a study of 1,244 individuals, 
over 50% of victims reported that their naked photos appeared next 
to their full name and social network profile; over 20% of victims 
reported that their e-mail addresses and telephone numbers 
 
 26. Former Boyfriend Pleads No Contest over Sex DVDs, CHESTERFIELD 
OBSERVER (Apr. 25, 2007), http://www.chesterfieldobserver.com/news/2007-04-
25/news/009.html. 
 27. Id. 
 28. Id. 
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appeared next to their naked photos.29  Posting naked images next 
to a person’s contact information often encourages strangers to 
confront the person offline.  Many revenge porn victims like Jane 
rightly worry that anonymous callers and e-mailers would follow up 
on their sexual demands in person. 
Victims’ fear can be profound.  They do not feel safe leaving 
their homes.  Jane, for example, did not go to work for days after she 
discovered the postings.30  Hollie Toups, a thirty-three-year-old 
teacher’s aide, explained that she was afraid to leave her home after 
someone posted her nude photograph, home address, and Facebook 
profile on a porn site.31  “I don’t want to go out alone,” she explained, 
“because I don’t know what might happen.”32 
Victims struggle especially with anxiety, and some suffer panic 
attacks.  Anorexia nervosa and depression are common ailments for 
individuals who are harassed online.33  Researchers have found that 
cyber harassment victims’ anxiety grows more severe over time.34  
Victims have difficulty thinking positive thoughts and doing their 
work.  According to a study conducted by the Cyber Civil Rights 
Initiative, over 80% of revenge porn victims experience severe 
emotional distress and anxiety.35 
Revenge porn is often a form of domestic violence.  Frequently, 
the intimate images are themselves the result of an abuser’s 
coercion of a reluctant partner.36  In numerous cases, abusers have 
threatened to disclose intimate images of their partners when 
victims attempt to leave the relationship.37  Abusers use the threat 
of disclosure to keep their partners under their control, making good 
on the threat once their partners find the courage to leave. 
 
 29. Cyber Civil Rights Statistics on Revenge Porn, at 2 (Oct. 11, 2013) (on 
file with authors) [hereinafter Revenge Porn Statistics]. 
 30. Interview with Jane, supra note 1. 
 31. Caille Millner, Public Humiliation over Private Photos, SFGATE, 
http://www.sfgate.com/opinion/article/Public-humiliation-over-private-photos-
4264155.php#photo-4161587 (last updated Feb. 10, 2013, 3:21 PM). 
 32. Id. 
 33. Suicide Spurs Web to Regulation in South Korea, NEWSWEEK (Oct. 14, 
2008, 8:00 PM), http://www.thedailybeast.com/newsweek/2008/10/14/when-
words-kill.html. 
 34. Matt R. Nobles et al., Protection Against Pursuit: A Conceptual and 
Empirical Comparison of Cyberstalking and Stalking Victimization Among a 
National Sample, JUST. Q. 1, 20, 22–23 (2012). 
 35. Revenge Porn Statistics, supra note 29. 
 36. See, e.g., Katie Smith, What Revenge Porn Did to Me, REFINERY29 (Nov. 
18, 2013, 3:15 PM), http://www.refinery29.com/2013/11/57495/revenge-porn 
#page-2 (“But about two and a half years into the relationship, he started 
badgering me about making a video. He got fixated on it . . . he would ask me, 
‘Why don’t you want to do it? Don’t you trust me?’ He just kept asking, and got 
more and more mean about it—’Don’t you care about our sex life? Don’t you care 
about things not being boring?’”). 
 37. See, e.g., Chiarini, supra note 7. 
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The professional costs of revenge porn are steep.  Because 
Internet searches of victims’ names prominently display their naked 
images or videos, many lose their jobs.  Schools have terminated 
teachers whose naked pictures appeared online.  A government 
agency ended a woman’s employment after a coworker circulated 
her nude photograph to colleagues.38 
Victims may be unable to find work at all.  Most employers rely 
on candidates’ online reputations as an employment screen.  
According to a 2009 study commissioned by Microsoft, nearly 80% of 
employers consult search engines to collect intelligence on job 
applicants, and, about 70% of the time, they reject applicants due to 
their findings.39  Common reasons for not interviewing and hiring 
applicants include concerns about their “lifestyle,” “inappropriate” 
online comments, and “unsuitable” photographs, videos, and 
information about them.40 
Recruiters do not contact victims to see if they posted the nude 
photos of themselves or if someone else did in violation of their trust. 
The “simple but regrettable truth is that after consulting search 
results, employers don’t call revenge porn victims to schedule” 
interviews or to extend offers.41  Employers do not want to hire 
individuals whose search results might reflect poorly on the 
employer.42 
To avoid further abuse, targeted individuals withdraw from 
online activities, which can be costly in many respects.  Closing 
down one’s blog can mean a loss of income and other career 
opportunities.43  In some fields, blogging is key to getting a job.  
 
 38. Second Amended Complaint at 3, 8, Lester v. Mineta, No. C-04-3074 SI 
(N.D. Cal. Mar. 3, 2006), 2006 WL 104226 (noting violations of: (1) The Civil 
Rights Act of 1964; (2) The Rehabilitation Act; (3) 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2012) 
(BIVENS); (4) 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3); and (5) 42 U.S.C. § 1986). 
 39. Online Reputation in a Connected World, JOB-HUNT 1, 3, 8 (Jan. 2010), 
http://www.job-hunt.org/guides/DPD_Online-Reputation-Research_overview 
.pdf. 
 40. MATT IVESTER, LOL . . . OMG! WHAT EVERY STUDENT NEEDS TO KNOW 
ABOUT ONLINE REPUTATION MANAGEMENT, DIGITAL CITIZENSHIP AND 
CYBERBULLYING 95 (2011). 
 41. Citron, supra note 1. 
 42. To be sure, employers refuse to interview or hire individuals for a 
variety of reasons, including, but not limited to, nonconsensual pornography.  It 
cannot be denied, however, that revenge porn has a negative impact.  
Employers have no incentive to hire someone whose online reputation could 
jeopardize the esteem of clients and business partners.  Their economic 
incentive is to attract more business.  Avoiding hiring someone who could cast 
doubt on the firm’s credibility is just smart business. 
 43. See Penelope Trunk, Blog Under Your Real Name, and Ignore the 
Harassment, PENELOPE TRUNK (July 19, 2007), http://blog.penelopetrunk.com 
/2007/07/19/blog-under-your-real-name-and-ignore-the-harassment (explaining 
that women who write under pseudonyms miss opportunities associated with 
blogging under their real names, such as networking opportunities and 
expertise associated with the author’s name). 
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According to technology blogger Robert Scoble, people who do not 
blog are “never going to be included in the [technology] industry.”44  
When victims shut down their profiles on social media platforms like 
Facebook, LinkedIn, and Twitter, they are saddled with low social 
media influence scores that can impair their ability to obtain 
employment.45  Companies like Klout measure people’s online 
influence by looking at their number of social media followers, 
updates, likes, retweets, and shares.  Not uncommonly, employers 
refuse to hire individuals with low social media influence scores.46 
Aside from these traditional harms, revenge porn can also 
amount to a degrading form of sexual harassment.  It exposes 
victims’ sexuality in humiliating ways.  Victims’ naked photos 
appear on slut-shaming47 sites, such as Cheaterville.com and 
MyEx.com.  Once their naked images are exposed, anonymous 
strangers can send e-mail messages that threaten rape.  Some have 
said: “First I will rape you, then I’ll kill you.”48  Victims internalize 
these frightening and demeaning messages.49  Women would more 
likely suffer harm as a result of the posting of their naked images 
than their male counterparts.  Gender stereotypes help explain 
why—women would be seen as immoral sluts for engaging in sexual 
activity, whereas men’s sexual activity is generally a point of 
pride.50 
While nonconsensual pornography can affect both men and 
women, empirical evidence indicates that nonconsensual 
pornography primarily affects women and girls.  In a study 
conducted by the Cyber Civil Rights Initiative, 90% of those 
victimized by revenge porn were female.51  Nonconsensual 
pornography, like rape, domestic violence, and sexual harassment, 
belongs to the category of violence that violates legal and social 
commitments to equality.  It denies women and girls control over 
their own bodies and lives.  Not only does it inflict serious and, in 
many cases, irremediable injury on individual victims, it constitutes 
a vicious form of sex discrimination. 
 
 44. Ellen Nakashima, Sexual Threats Stifle Some Female Bloggers, WASH. 
POST, Apr. 30, 2007, at A1. 
 45. Seth Stevenson, Popularity Counts, WIRED, May 2012, at 120, 122. 
 46. Id. at 120–22. 
 47. “Slut-shaming” criticizes women for sexual activity.  As noted journalist 
Emily Bazelon explains, slut-shaming is “retrograde, the opposite of feminist.  
Calling a girl a slut warns her that there’s a line: she can be sexual but not too 
sexual.”  EMILY BAZELON, STICKS AND STONES: DEFEATING THE CULTURE OF 
BULLYING AND REDISCOVERING THE POWER OF CHARACTER AND EMPATHY 95 
(2013). 
 48. DANIELLE KEATS CITRON, HATE CRIMES IN CYBERSPACE (forthcoming 
2014) (manuscript at 20). 
 49. Id. at 21. 
 50. Id.  There are exceptions, of course. 
 51. See Revenge Porn Statistics, supra note 29. 
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Revenge porn is a form of cyber harassment and cyber stalking 
whose victims are predominantly female.52  The U.S. National 
Violence Against Women Survey reports that 60% of cyber stalking 
victims are women.53  For over a decade, Working to Halt Online 
Abuse (“WHOA”) has collected information from cyber harassment 
victims.  Of the 3,787 individuals reporting cyber harassment to 
WHOA from 2000 to 2012, 72.5% were female, 22.5% were male, and 
5% were unknown.54  A victim’s actual or perceived sexual 
orientation seems to play a role as well.  Research suggests that 
sexual minorities are more vulnerable to cyber harassment than 
heterosexuals.55 
B. The Consent Conundrum 
Consensual sharing of intimate images is often done with the 
implied or express understanding that such images will remain 
confidential.  As revenge porn victims have told us time and again, 
they shared their explicit images or permitted the naked photos to 
be taken because, and only because, their partners assured them 
that the explicit images would be kept confidential. 
Nonetheless, the public tends to have difficulty recognizing the 
significance of such implied confidences in sexual contexts.  Critics 
resist the criminalization of revenge porn on the grounds that 
consensual sharing in one context—a trusted relationship—
translates into consent in other contexts—posting to the world.  
That understanding of consent not only runs against widely shared 
intuitions about other activities but also against the insights of 
privacy law and scholarship. 
 
 52. Cyber harassment is often understood to involve the intentional 
infliction of severe emotional distress accomplished by online speech that is 
persistent enough to amount to a “course of conduct,” rather than an isolated 
incident.  CITRON, supra note 28, at 6.  Cyber stalking has a more narrow 
meaning: it covers an online “course of conduct” designed to cause someone to 
fear bodily harm that would cause a reasonable person to fear for his or her 
safety.  Id. 
 53. Molly M. Ginty, Cyberstalking Turns Web Technologies into Weapons; 
Women Face Violence via Social Media, OTTAWA CITIZEN, Apr. 7, 2012, at J1. 
 54. Comparison Statistics 2000–2012, WORKING TO HALT ONLINE ABUSE 1, 1 
(2014), http://www.haltabuse.org/resources/stats/Cumulative2000-2012.pdf.  
WHOA’s statistics are gleaned from individuals who contact their organization 
through their website.  The organization’s statistics are not as comprehensive 
as the Bureau of Justice Statistics, which sponsored a national survey of 
individuals who experienced offline and online stalking.  According to the 
Bureau of Justice Statistics, an estimated 3.4 million people experienced real 
space stalking alone, while an estimated 850,000 individuals experienced 
stalking with both online and offline features.  Katrina Baum et al., Stalking 
Victimization in the United States, U.S. DEP’T JUSTICE 1, 5 (2009), 
http://www.ovw.usdoj.gov/docs/stalking-victimization.pdf. 
 55. Jerry Finn, A Survey of Online Harassment at a University Campus, 19 
J. INTERPERSONAL VIOLENCE 468, 477 (2004). 
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Consent to share information in one context does not serve as 
consent to share this information in another context.  When a 
person gives her credit card to a waiter, she is not consenting to let 
the waiter use that card to make personal purchases.  When a 
person entrusts a doctor with sensitive health information, he is not 
authorizing that doctor to share that information with the public.  
What lovers share with each other is not equivalent to what they 
share with coworkers, acquaintances, or employers.  Consent is 
contextual; it is not an on/off switch. 
Consent’s contextual nature is a staple of information privacy 
law.  A core teaching of the Fair Information Practice Principles is 
that sharing information for one purpose is not permission to share 
for other uses.56  Policymakers have long recognized the importance 
of context to the sharing of sensitive information.  Congress passed 
the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act to ensure that the trust of financial 
institutions’ customers would not be betrayed.57  With few 
exceptions, financial institutions cannot share their customers’ 
financial information with third parties.58  Similarly, the Video 
Privacy Protection Act recognizes that individuals may be willing to 
share their preferences for certain kinds of films with their video 
providers but not with the world at large.59  These laws recognize 
the contextual nature of consent—disclosing information to one 
entity does not signal consent to pass it on to others.60 
In its recent report, “Protecting Consumer Privacy in an Era of 
Rapid Change,” the Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”) laid out best 
privacy practices principles for private entities.61  A key 
recommendation was the recognition that a consumer’s consent to 
share information in one context does not translate into consent to 
share that information in other contexts.62  In instances where 
 
 56. See generally FED. TRADE COMM’N, PRIVACY ONLINE: A REPORT TO 
CONGRESS (1998), available at http://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents 
/reports/privacy-online-report-congress/priv-23a.pdf. (outlining five of the Fair 
Information Practice Principles). 
 57. See 15 U.S.C. § 6801(a) (2012) (addressing that “[i]t is the Policy of 
Congress that each financial institution has an affirmative and continuing 
obligation to respect the privacy of its customers . . . .”). 
 58. See id. 
 59. See 18 U.S.C. § 2710 (2012). 
 60. The so-called “third-party doctrine” in Fourth Amendment 
jurisprudence suggests the opposite, but such an understanding is inapt here 
for two reasons: one, the Fourth Amendment concerns citizens’ relationship to 
the government, not to other private citizens, and two, the doctrine has been 
strongly criticized even within the Fourth Amendment context, especially in the 
wake of the National Security Administration’s spying scandals. 
 61. See FED. TRADE COMM’N, PROTECTING CONSUMER PRIVACY IN AN ERA OF 
RAPID CHANGE (2010), available at http://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files 
/documents/reports/federal-trade-commission-bureau-consumer-protection-
preliminary-ftc-staff-report-protecting-consumer/101201privacyreport.pdf. 
 62. See id. at vi. 
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consumers would not expect their information to be shared with 
third parties, companies should ask consumers for their permission 
for such sharing.63  As the FTC underscored, when data is collected 
for one purpose and then treated differently, the failure to respect 
the original expectation is a cognizable harm.64 
The FTC’s report resonates with the work of privacy scholars.  
In her book Privacy in Context, Helen Nissenbaum argues that 
privacy is not a binary concept.65  Information is neither wholly 
private nor wholly public.  Context and social norms determine the 
question.  A person, for instance, might be willing to share personal 
information with her doctor but not her employer.  As Joel 
Reidenberg has argued, using data for a purpose other than the one 
the subject has permitted should be considered a cognizable harm.66 
Lior Strahilevitz’s social network theory of privacy explains that 
information may deserve privacy protection even if it is shared with 
a significant number of people.67  A group’s internal norms of 
information disclosure play a key role in determinations about 
privacy expectations.  For example, an HIV-positive person who told 
family, friends, and a support group about his HIV status did not 
extinguish his privacy interest in the information because the norm 
was that it would not be revealed with others who knew him or to 
the public at large.68  Daniel Solove’s pragmatic conception of 
privacy envisions context as central to understanding and 
addressing contemporary privacy problems.69 
As privacy law and literature suggest, consent is situational.  
Revenge porn victims share sexually explicit photographs of 
themselves with others based on the understanding that the photos 
remain confidential.  Sharing sensitive information, whether a nude 
photo, Social Security number, or HIV status, with a confidant does 
not mean one has waived all privacy expectation in the 
information.70 
 
 63. See, e.g., id. at vi, 55. 
 64. Id. at 20 n.49 (quoting Joel R. Reidenberg, Privacy Wrongs in Search of 
Remedies, 54 HASTINGS L.J. 877, 881 (2003)). 
 65. NISSENBAUM, supra note 22, at 144. 
 66. Joel R. Reidenberg, Privacy Wrongs in Search of Remedies, 54 HASTINGS 
L.J. 877, 881 (2003). 
 67. See generally Strahilevitz, supra note 13. 
 68. Multimedia WMAZ, Inc. v. Kubach, 443 S.E.2d 491, 494 (Ga. Ct. App. 
1994); Strahilevitz, supra note 22. 
 69. SOLOVE, UNDERSTANDING PRIVACY, supra note 13; Danielle Keats Citron 
& Leslie Meltzer Henry, Visionary Pragmatism and the Value of Privacy in the 
Twenty-First Century, 108 MICH. L. REV. 1107, 1112 (2010) (reviewing SOLOVE, 
UNDERSTANDING PRIVACY, supra note 22). 
 70. See, e.g., Kubach, 443 S.E.2d at 494.  The refusal to recognize the 
contextual nature of consent may stem from a moral disapproval of intimate 
photographs.  Some might argue that contextual integrity, as Nissenbaum calls 
it, is not extended to certain “morally questionable” content.  NISSENBAUM, 
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II.  THE INADEQUACY OF CIVIL ACTIONS 
Some commentators oppose regulatory proposals based on the 
argument that existing civil remedies can ably address revenge 
porn.71  Unfortunately, that is not the case.  Civil law can offer 
modest deterrence and remedy, but practical concerns often render 
them more theoretical than real.  As this Part concludes, more 
effective disincentives for nonconsensual pornography are needed 
than what civil actions can provide. 
A. Tort Law 
In theory, tort law reaches some of the harm suffered by 
revenge porn victims.  Victims could sue for intentional infliction of 
emotional distress, recovering for severe emotional suffering 
intentionally or recklessly caused.  Individuals are not expected to 
tolerate cruel invasions of their privacy that are extreme and 
outrageous.72  The privacy tort of public disclosure of private fact 
could provide relief.  Key to this tort is the public’s lack of a 
legitimate interest in the disclosed information.  Publishing a 
private person’s nude photos online is not a matter that legitimately 
concerns the public.73  Courts have recognized public disclosure 
claims where the plaintiff shared private information with one other 
trusted person.74 
Revenge porn victims have brought tort claims and won.  A 
woman sued her ex-boyfriend after he posted her nude photographs 
on twenty-three adult websites next to her contact information and 
alleged interest in a “visit or phone call.”75  Her ex created an online 
advertisement that said she wanted “no strings attached” 
masochistic sex.76  Strange men left her frightening voice mails.77  
 
supra note 22.  But determinations of what is morally questionable vary widely 
and are generally not a suitable basis for law. 
 71. See, e.g., Sarah Jeong, Revenge Porn Is Bad. Criminalizing It Is Worse, 
WIRED (Oct. 28, 2013, 9:30 AM), http://www.wired.com/opinion/2013/10/why-
criminalizing-revenge-porn-is-a-bad-idea/. 
 72. Cristina Carmody Tilley, Rescuing Dignitary Torts from the 
Constitution, 78 BROOK. L. REV. 65, 65 (2012). 
 73. See Daily Times Democrat v. Graham, 162 So. 2d 474, 477–78 (Ala. 
1964) (upholding disclosure claims where a newspaper published picture of a 
woman whose body was exposed after her dress was blown up by air jets 
because there was “nothing of legitimate news value in the photograph” and 
because, not only was the photograph embarrassing, it could be properly 
classified as obscenity given its offensiveness to modesty and the involuntary 
nature of the exposure to the public). 
 74. See generally DANIEL J. SOLOVE & PAUL M. SCHWARTZ, INFORMATION 
PRIVACY LAW (4th ed. 2011) (discussing court decisions involving public 
disclosure of private information). 
 75. Taylor v. Franko, No. 09-00002 JMS/RLP, 2011 WL 2746714, at 3 (D. 
Haw. June 12, 2011). 
 76. Id. at 4. 
 77. Id. 
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The woman suffered anxiety and a bout of shingles.78  She worried 
the abuse would impact her security clearance at work.79  A judge 
awarded the woman $425,000 for intentional infliction of emotional 
distress, defamation, and public disclosure of private fact.80 
One major problem, however, is that most victims lack 
resources to bring civil suits.  As we have heard from countless 
victims, many cannot afford to sue their perpetrators.  Having lost 
their jobs due to the online posts, they cannot pay their rent, let 
alone cover lawyer’s fees.  It may also be hard to find lawyers willing 
to take their cases.  Most lawyers do not know this area of law and 
are not prepared to handle the trickiness of online harassment 
evidence.  This reduces the deterrent effect of civil litigation, as 
would-be perpetrators are unlikely to fear a course of action that is 
unlikely to materialize. 
What is more, since plaintiffs in civil court generally have to 
proceed under their real names, victims may be reluctant to sue for 
fear of unleashing more unwanted publicity.  Generally, courts 
disfavor pseudonymous litigation because it is assumed to interfere 
with the transparency of the judicial process, to deny a defendant’s 
constitutional right to confront his or her accuser, and to encourage 
frivolous claims from being asserted by those whose names and 
reputations would not be on the line.  Arguments in favor of Jane 
Doe lawsuits are considered against the presumption of public 
opennessa heavy presumption that often works against plaintiffs 
asserting privacy invasions.81 
Even in ideal circumstances, where pseudonymous litigation is 
permitted and where a lawyer is willing to take the case, it may be 
hard to recover much in the way of damages.  Defendants often do 
not have deep pockets.  Victims may be hard pressed to expend their 
time and money on lawsuits if defendants are effectively judgment 
proof.  Then too, an award of damages is no assurance that websites 
will comply with requests to take down the images.  The removal of 
 
 78. See id. at 3. 
 79. Id. at 2. 
 80. Id. at 5.  Not only did the court find that the plaintiff sufficiently 
stated a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress, it upheld the 
plaintiff’s claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress despite the general 
requirement of physical injury.  The unique circumstances of the case made 
clear that the plaintiff’s distress was trustworthy and genuine.  Id.; see also Doe 
v. Hofstetter, No. 11-cv-02209-DME-MJW, 2012 WL 2319052, at *8 (D. Colo. 
June 13, 2012) (awarding plaintiff damages for intentional infliction of 
emotional distress where the defendant posted the plaintiff’s intimate 
photographs online, e-mailed them to her husband, and created fake Twitter 
accounts displaying them). 
 81. Doe v. Smith, 429 F.3d 706, 710 (7th Cir. 2005) (“The public has an 
interest in knowing what the judicial system is doing, an interest frustrated 
when any part of litigation is conducted in secret.”). 
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images is the outcome that most victims desire above all else, and 
civil litigation may be unable to make that happen.82 
Some argue that in cases where individual perpetrators are 
judgment proof, victims can bring claims against the websites that 
publish revenge porn and in turn drive the demand for it.  Generally 
speaking, site operators are immunized from tort liability related to 
a third party’s content.  Section 230 of the Communications Decency 
Act provides, “No provider or user of an interactive computer service 
shall be treated as the publisher or speaker of any information 
provided by another information content provider.”83  Courts have 
interpreted § 230 to largely immunize from liability website owners 
and operators for tortious material submitted by third-party users.84  
According to § 230, “[n]o cause of action may be brought and no 
liability may be imposed under any State or local law that is 
inconsistent with this section,” which indicates that the statute 
trumps civil and criminal state laws.85  If a user hacks into a 
person’s computer to obtain sexually explicit photographs and 
submits the photos, unsolicited, to a revenge porn website, the site 
owner would not be liable for displaying it.86 
B. Copyright Law 
Copyright law can seem like a promising avenue for redress 
because § 230 does not immunize websites from federal intellectual 
property claims.87  If a victim took the image herself then she would 
 
 82. See generally Matorin, supra note 25, (explaining that civil litigation 
may provide compensation to revenge porn victims but it “won’t remove the 
photos from the Internet or Google”). 
 83. 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1) (2012). 
 84. See, e.g., Zeran v. Am. Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327 (3rd Cir. 1997). 
 85. 47 U.S.C. § 230(e)(3).  A recent letter from the National Association of 
Attorneys General urged Congress to revise § 230 so that it cannot preempt 
state criminal law.  The current wording and interpretation of § 230, these 
Attorneys General maintain, impairs criminal prosecutions of child trafficking. 
See Letter From the Nat’l Ass’n of Attorneys Gen. to Congress (July 23, 2013), 
available at http://digitalcommons.law.scu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1465 
&context=historical. 
 86. We are leaving for other work the question of whether § 230’s immunity 
should be narrowed or if the statute in its current form should be understood as 
failing to immunize site operators who actively facilitate the posting of revenge 
porn.  One of us, Citron, supports a narrow amendment to § 230 for sites whose 
principal purpose is to host revenge porn.  See CITRON, supra note 48, at 176–
77.  The other, Franks, believes that a Ninth Circuit decision, Roommates.Com, 
supports the notion that sites that purposely solicit the posting of revenge porn 
are effectively cocreators of such content and thus enjoy no immunity.  Fair 
Hous. Council of San Fernando Valley v. Roommates.Com, LLC, 521 F.3d 1157, 
1164–65 (9th Cir. 2008).  Because we agree on so much, we thought it wise to 
note our disagreement on this issue and leave exploration of them for separate 
endeavors. 
 87. 47 U.S.C. § 230(e)(2) (“Nothing in this section shall be construed to 
limit or expand any law pertaining to intellectual property.”). 
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be considered the copyright owner.  In that case, the victim could file 
a § 512 notice after registering the copyright.88  The site operator 
would have to take down the allegedly infringing content promptly 
or lose their immunity under the Digital Millennium Copyright 
Act.89 
Even if the victim took the photo herself, however, her right to 
sue for a copyright violation may be illusory.  Revenge porn sites 
often ignore requests for removal because they are not worried about 
being sued.  They know that most victims cannot afford to hire a 
lawyer. 
 If a victim did not take the sexually explicit photo herself, she 
does not own the copyright—it belongs to the photographer.  Some 
lawyers and scholars have suggested that an expansive conception 
of joint authorship might cover these victims,90 but this theory is 
untested and may prove to have little traction.91 
 In any event, even successful copyright actions cannot put the 
genie back in the bottle.  Once an image is released, getting it 
removed from one site does not mean that it will be removed from 
every other site to which it has migrated.  Even more importantly, 
the suggestion that copyright law is an adequate response to 
nonconsensual porn mischaracterizes the harm as one of property 
rights.  While copyright remedies can certainly exist alongside and 
supplement other avenues of redress for victims, the harm involved 
in nonconsensual pornography cannot be reduced to a property 
claim.92 
C. Sexual Harassment Law 
Does revenge porn constitute actionable sexual harassment?  As 
defined by the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, sexual 
harassment includes “[u]nwelcome sexual advances, requests for 
sexual favors, and other verbal or physical conduct of a sexual 
nature.”93  Under current law, protections against sexual 
harassment have little force outside of employment and educational 
settings.94  Accordingly, while nonconsensual pornography that is 
 
 88. See 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(1)(C) (2012) 
 89. Site operators are not liable for infringement if they take down the 
allegedly infringing content.  See 17 U.S.C. § 512(a). 
 90. See Derek Bambauer, Beating Revenge Porn with Copyright (Jan. 25, 
2013), https://blogs.law.harvard.edu/infolaw/2013/01/25/beating-revenge-porn-
with-copyright/. 
 91. See generally Derek Bambauer, Exposed, 98 MINN. L. REV. (forthcoming 
2014). 
 92. See Matorin, supra note 25 (arguing that attempts to cast revenge porn 
as a copyright issue “are absurd”). 
 93. 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(a) (2013). 
 94. In different ways, we have argued that the protection against sexual 
harassment, as a form of sex discrimination, should not be so limited.  Compare 
Mary Anne Franks, Sexual Harassment 2.0, 71 MD. L. REV. 655, 657 (2012) 
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produced, distributed, or accessed by a victim’s coworkers, 
employers, school officials, or fellow students raises the possibility of 
a hostile environment sexual harassment claim under Title VII of 
the Civil Rights Act of 196495 or Title IX of the Education 
Amendments of 1972,96 such claims would not be available to 
address nonconsensual pornography falling outside of this narrow 
category. 
As this discussion shows, civil law cannot meaningfully deter 
and redress revenge porn.  We now turn to the potential for a 
criminal law response. 
III.  CRIMINAL LAW’S POTENTIAL TO COMBAT REVENGE PORN 
A criminal law solution is essential to deter judgment-proof 
perpetrators.  As attorney and revenge porn expert Erica Johnstone 
puts it, “Even if people aren’t afraid of being sued because they have 
nothing to lose, they are afraid of being convicted of a crime because 
that shows up on their record forever.”97  Nonconsensual 
pornography’s rise is surely related to the fact that malicious actors 
have little incentive to refrain from such behavior.  While some 
critics believe that existing criminal law adequately addresses 
nonconsensual pornography, this Part highlights how existing 
criminal law fails to address most cases of revenge porn. 
A. The Importance of Criminal Law 
Criminal law has long prohibited privacy invasions and certain 
violations of autonomy.  Criminal law is essential to send the clear 
message to potential perpetrators that nonconsensual pornography 
 
(contending that site operators should be liable for sexual harassment hosted on 
their sites), with Danielle Keats Citron, Cyber Civil Rights, 89 B.U. L. REV. 61, 
91–95 (2009) (arguing that cyber harassment ought to be addressed as civil 
rights violations and thus harassers should face liability under anti-
discrimination laws, including Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and 
Section 1981 of Title 42, among other claims); see also Danielle Keats Citron & 
Helen Norton, Intermediaries and Hate Speech: Fostering Digital Citizenship for 
Our Information Age, 91 B.U. L. REV. 1435, 1436–53 (2011) (arguing that cyber 
harassment interferes with victims’ ability to interact as digital citizens); 
Citron, supra note 10, at 375–77 (arguing that a cyber civil rights legal agenda 
has a crucial role in educating the public, law enforcement, courts, and victims 
about cyber harassment’s interference with victims’ equality).  Citron’s 
forthcoming book on cyber harassment proposes an amendment to Title VII 
that would permit suits against perpetrators of discriminatory cyber 
harassment for interfering with victims’ important economic and educational 
opportunities. CITRON, supra note 48. 
 95. tit. VII, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e–2000e-15 (2012). 
 96. tit. IX, 20 U.S.C. §§ 1681–1688 (2012). 
 97. Tracy Clark-Flory, Criminalizing “Revenge Porn,” SALON (Apr. 6, 2013, 
9:00 PM), http://www.salon.com/2013/04/07/criminalizing_revenge_porn/. 
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inflicts grave privacy and autonomy harms that have real 
consequences and penalties.98 
While we share general concerns about overcriminalization and 
overincarceration, rejecting the criminalization of serious harms is 
not the way to address those concerns.  To argue that our society 
should not criminalize certain behavior because too many other 
kinds of behavior are already criminalized is at best a non sequitur.  
Only the shallowest of thinkers would suggest that the question 
whether nonconsensual pornography should be 
criminalizedindeed, whether any conduct should be 
criminalizedshould turn on something as contingent and arbitrary 
as the number of existing laws.  Rather, the question of 
criminalization should be a question about the seriousness of the 
harm caused and whether such harm is adequately conceptualized 
as a harm only to individuals, for which tort remedies are sufficient, 
or should be conceptualized as a harm to both individuals and 
society as a whole for which civil penalties are not adequate, thus 
warranting criminal penalties.99 
We are also sensitive to objections that criminalizing revenge 
porn might reinforce the harmful and erroneous perception that 
women should be ashamed of their bodies or their sexual activities, 
but maintain that recognizing and protecting sexual autonomy does 
exactly the opposite.100  A criminal law solution would send the 
message that individuals’ bodies are their own and that society 
recognizes the grave harms that flow from turning individuals into 
objects of pornography without their consent. 
In this way, a criminal law approach will help us conceptualize 
the nonconsensual publication of someone’s sexually explicit images 
as a form of sexual abuse.  When sexual abuse is inflicted on an 
individual’s physical body, it is considered rape or sexual assault.  
The fact that nonconsensual pornography does not involve physical 
contact does not change the fact that it is a form of sexual abuse.  As 
 
 98. See Mary Anne Franks, Why Revenge Porn Must Be a Crime, 
NYDAILYNEWS.COM (Mar. 17, 2014), http://www.nydailynews.com/opinion 
/revenge-porn-crime-article-1.1702725. 
 99. See, e.g., John C. Coffee, Jr., Does “Unlawful” Mean “Criminal”?: 
Reflections on the Disappearing Tort/Crime Distinction in American Law, 71 
B.U. L. REV. 193, 221–22 (1991) (noting, though criticizing, the “standard ‘black 
letter’ law distinction . . . that crimes represent injuries to society generally, 
while torts involve only private interests,” but also conceding that “there are 
public values that would be injured if criminal behavior were treated only as 
tortious conduct for which the victim must be made whole through 
compensation”). 
 100. A comparison can be made here to rape laws.  While it is possible to 
interpret the criminal punishment for rape as reinforcing the view that women 
who are raped are “damaged,” we do not think this is a necessary or correct 
interpretation.  In fact, the real danger lies in failing to seriously punish 
violations of sexual autonomy. 
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Supreme Court Justice Horace Gray wrote in 1891, “The 
inviolability of the person is as much invaded by a compulsory 
stripping and exposure as by a blow.  To compel any one . . . to lay 
bare the body, or to submit it to the touch of a stranger, without 
lawful authority, is an indignity, an assault, and a trespass . . . .”101  
Federal and state criminal laws regarding voyeurism demonstrate 
that physical contact is not necessary to cause great harm and 
suffering.102 
Video voyeurism laws punish the nonconsensual recording of a 
person in a state of undress in places where individuals enjoy a 
reasonable expectation of privacy.103  Criminal laws prohibiting 
voyeurism rest on the commonly accepted assumption that 
observing a person in a state of undress or engaged in sexual 
activity without that person’s consent not only inflicts dignitary 
harms upon the individual observed, but also inflicts a social harm 
serious enough to warrant criminal prohibition and punishment. 
International criminal law provides precedent and perspective 
on this issue.  Both the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda 
(“ICTR”) and the International Criminal Tribunal for the former 
Yugoslavia (“ICTY”) have employed a definition of sexual violence 
that does not require physical contact.  In both tribunals, forced 
nudity was found to be a form of sexual violence.104  In the Akayesu 
case, the ICTR found that “[s]exual violence is not limited to 
physical invasion of the human body and may include acts which do 
not involve penetration or even physical contact.”105  In the 
Furundzija case, the ICTY similarly found that international 
criminal law punishes not only rape, but also “all serious abuses of a 
sexual nature inflicted upon the physical and moral integrity of a 
person by means of coercion, threat of force or intimidation in a way 
that is degrading and humiliating for the victim’s dignity.”106 
The legal and social condemnation of child pornography 
exemplifies our collective understanding that the viewing and 
distributionnot just productionof certain kinds of sexual images 
 
 101. Union Pac. Ry. Co. v. Botsford, 141 U.S. 250, 252 (1891). 
 102. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 1801 (2012); see also Nat’l Ctr. for Prosecution of 
Child Abuse, supra note 16 (providing an inventory of state voyeurism 
statutes). 
 103. 18 U.S.C. § 1801. 
 104. See ANN-MARIE DE BROUWER, SUPRANATIONAL CRIMINAL PROSECUTION OF 
SEXUAL VIOLENCE 135–37 (2005); LISTENING TO THE SILENCES: WOMEN AND WAR 
146–47 (Helen Durham & Tracey Gurd eds., 2005). 
 105. Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-4-T, Judgment, ¶ 688 (Int’l 
Crim. Trib. for Rwanda Sept. 2, 1998), http://www.unictr.org/Portals/0/Case 
/English/Akayesu/judgement/akay001.pdf. 
 106. Prosecutor v. Furundzija, Case No. IT-95-17/1-T, Judgment, ¶ 186 (Int’l 
Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Dec. 10, 1998), http://www.icty.org/x 
/cases/furundzija/tjug/en/fur-tj981210e.pdf. 
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are harmful.  In New York v. Ferber,107 the United States Supreme 
Court recognized that the distribution of child pornography is 
distinct from the underlying crime of the sexual abuse of children.108  
The Court observed that “[t]he distribution of photographs and films 
depicting sexual activity by juveniles . . . [is] a permanent record of 
the children’s participation and the harm to the child is exacerbated 
by their circulation.”109  When images and videos of sexual assaults 
and surreptitious observation are distributed and consumed, they 
inflict further harms on the victims and on society connected to, but 
distinct from, the criminal acts to which the victims were originally 
subjected.110  The trafficking of this material increases the demand 
for images and videos that exploit the individuals portrayed.  This is 
why the Court in Ferber held that it is necessary to shut down the 
“distribution network” of child pornography to reduce the sexual 
exploitation of children: “The most expeditious if not the only 
practical method of law enforcement may be to dry up the market 
for this material by imposing severe criminal penalties on persons 
selling, advertising, or otherwise promoting the product.”111 
Nonconsensual pornography raises similar concerns.  Disclosing 
sexually explicit images without permission can have lasting and 
destructive consequences.  Victims often internalize socially imposed 
shame and humiliation every time they see them and every time 
they think that others are viewing them. 
Consider the experience of sports reporter Erin Andrews.  After 
a stalker secretly taped her while she undressed in her hotel room, 
he posted as many as ten videos of her online.112  Google Trends 
data suggested that just after the release of the videos, much of the 
nation began looking for some variation of “Erin Andrews peephole 
video.”113  Nearly nine months later, Andrews explained, “I haven’t 
stopped being victimized—I’m going to have to live with this 
forever . . . .  When I have kids and they have kids, I’ll have to 
 
 107. 458 U.S. 747 (1982). 
 108. Id. at 764. 
 109. Id. at 759. 
 110. See Emily Bazelon, The Price of a Stolen Childhood, N.Y. TIMES MAG. 
(Jan. 24, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/01/27/magazine/how-much-can-
restitution-help-victims-of-child-pornography.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0. 
 111. Ferber, 458 U.S. at 760. 
 112. Lynn Lamanivong, Erin Andrews’ Video Voyeur Gets 2½ Years, CNN 
(Mar. 16, 2010, 9:49 AM), http://www.cnn.com/2010/CRIME/03/15/espn.erin 
.andrews.sentence/; see Danielle Keats Citron, Mainstreaming Privacy Torts, 98 
CALIF. L. REV. 1805, 1813–14 (2010) (discussing privacy harms experienced by 
Erin Andrews). 
 113. Steve Johnson, Erin Andrews’ Nude Video Coverage Full of Hypocrisy, 
CHI. TRIB. (July 23, 2009), http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2009-07-23 
/entertainment/0907220636_1_erin-andrews-video-web. 
W05_CITRON  (DO NOT DELETE) 5/19/2014  11:01 AM 
2014] CRIMINALIZING REVENGE PORN 365 
explain to them why this is on the Internet.”114  She further 
lamented that when she walks into football stadiums to report on a 
game, she faces the taunts of fans who have seen her naked 
online.115  She explained that she “felt like [she] was continuing to 
be victimized” each time she talked about it.116 
Andrews’s experience is echoed by that of Lena Chen, who 
allowed her ex-boyfriend to take pictures of them having sex.117  
After he betrayed her trust and posted the pictures online, the 
pictures went viral.118  As Chen explained, feeling ashamed of her 
sexuality was not something that came naturally to her, but it is 
now something she knows inside and out.119  Victims of 
nonconsensual pornography are harmed each time a person views or 
shares their intimate images. 
B. Current Criminal Law’s Limits 
Existing federal and state criminal laws have limited 
application to the initial posters of nonconsensual pornography and 
the laws have even less force with regard to site operators.  This 
Subpart first explores the potential of criminal harassment statutes 
in pursuing the original discloser.  Then, it turns to the possibility of 
extortion and child pornography charges against revenge porn site 
operators. 
1. Punishing Original Disclosers Under Criminal Law 
Many scholars believe that existing criminal law adequately 
addresses revenge porn.  Professor Eric Goldman, for instance, 
argues that criminal harassment laws punish the distribution of 
sexually explicit images when there is intent to harm, but that is not 
always true.120  Two potential hurdles stand in the way. 
The first hurdle is that criminal harassment and stalking laws 
only apply to defendants who engage in repeated harassing acts.  
The federal cyber stalking statute, 18 U.S.C. § 2261A, bans as a 
felony the use of any “interactive computer service” to engage in a 
 
 114. Leslie Casimir, The ESPN Girl Takes a Stand, GLAMOUR (Mar. 5, 2010), 
http://www.glamour.com/inspired/magazine/2010/03/the-espn-girl-takes-a-
stand. 
 115. Id. 
 116. Michael Y. Park, Erin Andrews Calls Peeping-Tom Video a 
“Nightmare,” PEOPLE (Sept. 1, 2009, 11:50 AM), http://www.people.com/people 
/article/0,,20301731,00.html. 
 117. Lena Chen, I Was the Harvard Harlot, SALON (May 23, 2011, 9:01 PM), 
http://www.salon.com/2011/05/24/harvard_harlot_sexual_shame/. 
 118. Id. 
 119. Id. 
 120. See Eric Goldman, California’s New Law Shows It’s Not Easy to 
Regulate Revenge Porn, FORBES (Oct. 8, 2013, 12:03 PM), http://www.forbes.com 
/sites/ericgoldman/2013/10/08/californias-new-law-shows-its-not-easy-to-
regulate-revenge-porn/. 
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“course of conduct” intended to harass or intimidate someone in 
another state that either places that person in reasonable fear of 
serious bodily injury or death or that would reasonably be expected 
to cause the person to suffer “substantial emotional distress.”121 
A single posting of someone’s name, address, and sexually 
explicit image can cause serious damage but would not amount to a 
harassing “course of conduct.”  A revenge porn post can go viral, but 
the poster who started the cascade could evade harassment charges.  
As Jane’s experience attests, a single post, e-mail, or other 
disclosure of nonconsensual pornography can cause grave harm.122 
The second problem is that some state harassment laws only 
apply to persistent abuse communicated directly to victims.  A New 
York state court recently dismissed charges against a man who 
posted his ex-girlfriend’s nude photos on Twitter and sent the photos 
to the woman’s employer and sister.123  The court justified its 
dismissal of the aggravated harassment charge on the grounds that 
the man had not sent the nude photos to the woman herself, but 
rather to others.124  Revenge porn posted on third-party sites would 
not be banned under harassment statutes that require direct contact 
with victims.125 
Even when revenge porn does fit the definition of criminal 
harassment, police may decline to get involved.  Victims are often 
told that the behavior is not serious enough for an in-depth 
 
 121. 18 U.S.C. § 2261A(2) (2012).  Under the federal cyber-stalking statute, 
defendants can be punished for up to five years in jail and fined $250,000.  
Many states similarly define criminal cyber harassment but treat it as a 
misdemeanor with modest sentences and fines.  See, e.g., MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 
265, § 43A (LexisNexis 2010) (covering a willful and malicious engagement in a 
pattern of acts or series of acts via e-mail or “internet communications” that is 
directed at a specific person, which seriously alarms that person and would 
cause a reasonable person to suffer substantial emotional distress); SUSAN 
PRICE, CONN. GEN. ASSEMB. OFFICE LEGIS. RESEARCH, 2012-R-0293, OLR 
BACKGROUNDER: CYBERSTAKING (2012) (describing variations in the thirty-four 
state cyber-stalking laws surveyed by the National Conference of State 
Legislatures). 
 122. Unfortunately, even if revenge porn is part of a broader course of 
harassing conduct, law enforcement routinely refuses to take it seriously 
because they lack technical understanding of the problem and believe that 
conduct regarding sexually intimate images is innocuous.  Citron, supra note 
19, at 402.  That problem extends to revenge porn as well. 
 123. See Mary Anne Franks, We Need New Laws to Put a Stop to Revenge 
Porn, INDEP. (Feb. 23, 2014), http://www.independent.co.uk/voices/comment/we-
need-new-laws-to-put-a-stop-to-revenge-porn-9147620.html. 
 124. People v. Barber, 2014 N.Y. Slip. Op. 50193(U) (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Feb. 18, 
2014); Erin Donaghue, Judge Throws Out New York Revenge Porn Case, CBS 
(Feb. 25, 2014, 4:42 PM), http://www.cbsnews.com/news/judge-throws-out-new-
york-revenge-porn-case/. 
 125. Id. 
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investigation.126  “They are shooed away because, officers say, they 
are to blame for the whole mess, since they chose to share their 
intimate pictures.”127 
Consider Holly Jacobs’s case.  Hundreds of porn and revenge 
porn sites featured her nude images next to her work biography and 
e-mail address.128  Some posts falsely claimed that she would have 
sex for money and that she had slept with her students.129  Law 
enforcement officers told her that because she voluntarily gave the 
photos to her ex-boyfriend, he owned them and could freely share 
them.130 
Jacobs refused to give up on the potential for criminal law.  
After contacting U.S. Senator Marco Rubio’s office, the Florida State 
Attorney’s office took up her case and charged her ex with a 
misdemeanor count of cyber stalking.131  Investigators traced one of 
the porn posts to her ex’s IP address.132  They told Jacobs that they 
needed a warrant to search his computer for further evidence 
because her ex had claimed that he had been hacked and denied 
releasing Jacobs’s pictures.133 
 The charges against her ex were dismissed when prosecutors 
decided they could not justify seeking a warrant for a misdemeanor 
case.134  Their hands were tied, they said, even though “I’ve been 
hacked” is a standard defense in cyber stalking cases.135  Jacobs’s 
case apparently was not serious enough for the police to obtain a 
warrant to search a defendant’s computer or home.136 
2. Prosecuting Site Operators for Extortion and Child 
Pornography 
What about website operators’ criminal liability under current 
state or federal criminal law?  Although § 230 immunity is broad, it 
is not absolute.  It exempts from its reach federal criminal law, 
intellectual property law, and the Electronic Communications 
 
 126. See Citron, supra note 19, at 37576 (highlighting the tendency of law 
enforcement to dismiss harassment complaints). 
 127. Danielle Citron, How to Make Revenge Porn a Crime: Worried About 
Trampling on Free Speech? Don’t Be., SLATE (Nov. 7, 2013, 1:04 PM), 
http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/jurisprudence/2013/11/making_
revenge_porn_a_crime_without_trampling_free_speech.html. 
 128. Id. 
 129. Id. 
 130. Id. 
 131. Id. 
 132. Id. 
 133. Id. 
 134. Id. 
 135. Id. 
 136. CITRON, supra note 48 (discussing in detail Holly Jacobs’s revenge porn 
experience); Citron, supra note 19. 
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Privacy Act.137  As § 230(e) provides, the statute has “[n]o effect” on 
“any [f]ederal criminal statute” and does not “limit or expand any 
law pertaining to intellectual property.”138 
The recent federal prosecution against revenge porn site 
operator Hunter Moore has been invoked as support for the notion 
that no new laws are needed to take on revenge porn.  In December 
2013, federal prosecutors indicted Moore for conspiring to hack into 
people’s computers to steal their nude images.139  According to the 
indictment, Moore paid a computer hacker to access women’s 
password-protected computers and e-mail accounts to steal their 
nude photos for financial gain—profits from his revenge porn site Is 
Anyone Up.140 
While the prosecution of Moore is cause for celebration, it is a 
mistake to draw from it the conclusion that existing laws are 
sufficient to address revenge porn.  The fact that one revenge porn 
site owner allegedly broke numerous federal laws in running a 
revenge porn website does not change the fact that he is facing no 
charges for publishing the content itself,141 and that the next 
revenge porn entrepreneur will no doubt learn not to make the same 
mistakes as Hunter Moore. 
State prosecutors are currently pursuing extortion charges 
against site operators who call for posters to upload their exes’ 
naked images and then charge a hefty fee for the removal of those 
photos.142  There is a strong argument that § 230’s immunity does 
not apply to those who extort victims whose predicament they have 
helped orchestrate.  California Attorney General Kamala Harris has 
brought the first cases to press the question.143 
In December 2013, the operator of revenge porn site 
UGotPosted, Kevin Bollaert, was indicted for extortion, conspiracy, 
and identity theft in violation of California state laws.144  The site 
featured the nude photos, Facebook screen shots, and contact 
information of more than 10,000 individuals.145  According to the 
 
 137. See 47 U.S.C. § 230(e) (2012). 
 138. Id. 
 139. Jessica Roy, Revenge-Porn King Hunter Moore Indicted on Federal 
Charges, TIME (Jan. 23, 2014), http://time.com/1703/revenge-porn-king-hunter-
moore-indicted-by-fbi/. 
 140. Id. 
 141. Justin Mitchell, Law Takes Revenge on “Revenge Porn King,” VOICE 
RUSS. (Jan. 24, 2009, 11:49 AM), http://voiceofrussia.com/us/2014_01_24/Law-
takes-revenge-on-revenge-porn-king-2424/. 
 142. See, e.g., Lee Munson, Revenge Porn Operator Facing Charges of 
Conspiracy, Extortion and Identity Theft, NAKED SECURITY (Dec. 11, 2013), 
http://nakedsecurity.sophos.com/2013/12/11/revenge-porn-operator-facing-
charges-of-conspiracy-extortion-and-identity-theft/. 
 143. See id. 
 144. Id. 
 145. Id. 
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indictment, Bollaert ran the revenge porn site with a companion 
takedown site, Change My Reputation.146  When Bollaert received 
complaints from individuals who appeared in nude photos, he 
allegedly sent them e-mails directing them to the takedown site, 
which charged up to $350 for the removal of photos.147  Attorney 
General Harris explained that Bollaert “published intimate photos 
of unsuspecting victims and turned their public humiliation and 
betrayal into a commodity with the potential to devastate lives.”148 
 Bollaert will likely challenge the State’s identity theft charges 
on § 230 grounds.149  Because California’s identity theft laws are 
somewhat unusual,150 it is unclear how successful Bollaert’s defense 
will be.  He may also try to argue that charging for the removal of 
user-generated photos is not tantamount to authoring or 
codeveloping them, that is, charging for the removal of content is not 
the same as paying for or helping develop it.151  Nonetheless, the 
State has a strong argument that the extortion charges fall outside § 
230’s immunity because the charges hinge on what Bollaert himself 
did and said, not on what his users posted. 
Even if the California Attorney General’s charges are dismissed 
on § 230 grounds, federal prosecutors could charge Bollaert with 
federal criminal extortion charges.  Sites that encourage cyber 
harassment and charge for its removal (or have a financial 
arrangement with removal services) are engaging in extortion. 
But of course revenge porn operators who charge for the 
removal of images are not the only ones hosting revenge porn.  
There are countless other sites and blogs that host revenge porn 
that do not engage in extortion.  If these criminal prosecutions are 
successful, site operators will stop charging for the removal of 
photos and the phenomenon will still continue. 
Prosecuting site operators for violating federal cyber-stalking 
law is even less promising than prosecuting original disclosers.  
Most site operators cannot be said to have engaged in a pattern of 
harassing conduct vis-à-vis any given victim.  They lack the 
requisite intent to “kill, injure, harass, or place under surveillance 
 
 146. Id. 
 147. Id. 
 148. Id. 
 149. See Eric Goldman, Should We Cheer the California Attorney General’s 
Revenge Porn Arrest—or Find It Alarming?, FORBES (Dec. 11, 2013, 1:55 PM), 
http://www.forbes.com/sites/ericgoldman/2013/12/11/should-we-cheer-the-
california-attorney-generals-revenge-porn-arrest-or-find-it-alarming/. 
 150. See Ryan Calo, Creative Revenge Porn Charges Filed in California, 
FORBES (Dec. 10, 2013, 6:01 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/ryancalo 
/2013/12/10/creative-revenge-porn-charges-filed-in-california/. 
 151. Mary Anne Franks, The Lawless Internet? Myths and Misconceptions 
About CDA Section 230, HUFFINGTON POST (Dec. 18, 2013, 5:36 PM), 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/mary-anne-franks/section-230-the-lawless-
internet_b_4455090.html. 
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with intent to kill, injure, harass, or intimidate, or cause substantial 
emotional distress” a particular person.152  Many admitted 
purveyors of nonconsensual pornography maintain, with some 
plausibility, that their sole intention is to obtain notoriety, fulfill 
some sexual desire, or increase traffic for their websites. 
What about child pornography laws?  While “pornography” is to 
some degree regulated by federal criminal law, federal law focuses 
almost exclusively on the age of the material’s subjects.153  Little 
attention is paid to individuals’ consent (or lack thereof) to be 
portrayed in such a manner.  With regard to original perpetrators of 
nonconsensual pornography, both state and federal child 
pornography laws can be used to deter and prosecute the production 
of sexually explicit material featuring underage individuals.  Section 
2256 of Title 18 defines child pornography as any visual depiction of 
sexually explicit conduct involving a minor (someone under eighteen 
years of age).154  “Visual depictions include photographs, videos, 
digital or computer generated images indistinguishable from an 
actual minor, and images created, adapted, or modified, but appear 
to depict an identifiable, actual minor.”155  These provisions do not 
apply, of course, to victims over the age of eighteen, seriously 
limiting the usefulness of these prohibitions in revenge porn cases. 
One commentator contends that criminal penalties applicable to 
general pornographers could apply to revenge porn site operators.156  
That is not the case.  Section 2257 of Title 18 sets out recordkeeping 
requirements for those engaged in “producing” pornography.157  The 
statute’s definition of “produces” or “producing” pornography tracks 
the definition of § 230 of the Communications Decency Act, which 
means it does not cover websites that facilitate or distribute 
material submitted by third-party users.158  The statute also focuses 
almost exclusively on age-verifying identification.159  It sets out no 
requirements to verify that the individuals portrayed have 
consented to the use of their images.  While this law may provide 
some disincentives for distributing nonconsensual pornography of 
underage individuals, it will not have any effect on the distribution 
of material featuring adult victims. 
 
 152. 18 U.S.C. § 2261A (2012). 
 153. See generally id. § 2256. 
 154. Id. § 2256. 
 155. Citizen’s Guide to U.S. Federal Law on Child Pornography, U.S. DEP’T 
JUST., http://www.justice.gov/criminal/ceos/citizensguide/citizensguide_porn 
.html (last visited Feb. 9, 2014). 
 156. Jeong, supra note 60. 
 157. See 18 U.S.C. § 2257(b) (providing record-keeping requirements for 
those who produce “sexually explicit conduct”). 
 158. See id. § 2257(h)(2) (defining the term “produces”). 
 159. See id. § 2257(b). 
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C. Current Efforts to Criminalize Nonconsensual Pornography 
To date, New Jersey, Alaska, Texas, California, Idaho, and Utah 
are the only states that criminalize the nonconsensual disclosure of 
someone’s sexually intimate images.160  During the writing of this 
Article, legislators in seventeen states have proposed revenge porn 
bills.161  We provide our thoughts on these developments, noting the 
strengths and weaknesses of the various approaches and offering 
suggestions of our own.  We reserve our views on the 
constitutionality of these proposals for the next Part. 
New Jersey, the first state to criminalize revenge porn, has the 
broadest statute, prohibiting the nonconsensual observation, 
recording, or disclosure of sexually explicit images.  Under New 
Jersey law, it is a third-degree crime162 to post or share a person’s 
nude or partially nude images without that person’s consent.163  The 
New Jersey law provides the following: 
An actor commits a crime of the third degree if, knowing that 
he is not licensed or privileged to do so, he discloses any 
photograph, film, videotape, recording or any other 
reproduction of the image of another person whose intimate 
parts are exposed or who is engaged in an act of sexual 
penetration or sexual contact, unless that person has 
consented to such disclosure.  For purposes of this subsection, 
“disclose” means sell, manufacture, give, provide, lend, trade, 
mail, deliver, transfer, publish, distribute, circulate, 
disseminate, present, exhibit, advertise or offer.164 
The crime carries a prison sentence ranging from three to five 
years.165 
Although the law has been around for almost a decade, it has 
been invoked in only a few cases.166  In a recent case, the defendant 
 
 160. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:14-9 (West 2005) (taking effect on Jan. 8, 2004); 
S.B. 255, 2013-2014 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2013). Idaho and Utah passed laws in 2014. 
See 2014 Idaho Sess. Laws 173 (H.B. 563); 2014 Utah Laws 124 (H.B. 71). 
 161. Franks has been advising legislators all across the country, from New 
York and Wisconsin to Florida and Illinois to name just a few.  Franks is also 
working with Congresswoman Jackie Speier in drafting a federal revenge porn 
bill.  Franks and Citron worked with Maryland delegate Jon Cardin in crafting 
his revenge porn bill.  Legislators in Florida attempted to pass a much less clear 
and much less comprehensive bill in their most recent term, but the measure 
died in committee.  The bill’s original sponsors have declared that they will 
attempt to introduce the bill again in their next session and have been working 
with Franks on revisions.  Rick Stone, In Florida, “Revenge Porn” Is a Moving 
Target, WLRN (Dec. 4, 2013, 7:56 AM), http://wlrn.org/post/florida-revenge-
porn-moving-target. 
 162. New Jersey does not use the classifications of “felony” and 
“misdemeanor.”  See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:52-2 (West 2005). 
 163. Id. § 2C:14-9. 
 164. Id. § 2C:14-9(c). 
 165. Id. § 2C:43-6. 
W05_CITRON  (DO NOT DELETE) 5/19/2014  11:01 AM 
372 WAKE FOREST LAW REVIEW [Vol. 49 
and victim exchanged “unclothed” photos of each other while 
dating.167  After their break up, the defendant threatened to send 
the victim’s nude pictures to her employer, a public school.168  The 
defendant followed up on his threat, forwarding the pictures to the 
school stating “you have an educator there that is . . . not proper.”169  
The defendant admitted to sending the pictures.170  The defendant 
was convicted for disclosing naked images given with the 
understanding that they would not be shared with others.171 
In 2010, Rutgers University student Dahrun Ravi was charged 
under the New Jersey statute after he secretly filmed his roommate 
Tyler Clementi having sex with a man and watched the live feed 
with six friends.172  Clementi committed suicide after discovering 
what had happened.173  The jury convicted Ravi of various counts of 
invasion of privacy, including the nonconsensual “observation” of 
Clementi having sex and the nonconsensual “disclosure” of the sex 
video.174 
On January 8, 2014, Maryland legislator Jon Cardin proposed a 
revenge porn bill that resembled the New Jersey approach.175  The 
proposed bill bars the disclosure of a person’s sexually explicit or 
nude images “knowing that the other person has not consented to 
the disclosure.”176  The proposed bill included various exemptions, 
 
 166. In 2012, Brandon Carangelo was charged under the New Jersey statute 
for uploading pictures of his ex-girlfriend without her consent.  Michaelangelo 
Conte, Bayonne Man Charged with Posting Nude Photos of Ex-Girlfriend on 
Internet, NJ.COM (Oct. 23, 2012, 5:59 PM), http://www.nj.com/hudson/index.ssf 
/2012/10/bayonne_man_charged_with_posti.html. 
 167. State v. Parsons, No. 10-06-01372, 2011 WL 6089210, at 1 (N.J. Super. 
Ct. App. Div. Dec. 8, 2011). 
 168. Id. 
 169. Id. 
 170. Id. 
 171. Id. at 1–3. 
 172. Star-Ledger Staff, Dharun Ravi Sentenced to Jail in Tyler Clementi 
Webcam Spying Case, NJ.COM (May 21, 2012, 9:57 PM), http://www.nj.com/news 
/index.ssf/2012/05/dharun_ravi_sentenced_to_jail.html. 
 173. Id. 
 174. Id. 
 175. See H.B. 43, 2014 Leg., 435th Sess. (Md. 2014). 
For the purpose of prohibiting a person from intentionally disclosing a 
certain sexually explicit image of a certain other person, knowing that 
the other person has not consented to the disclosure; providing 
penalties for a violation of this Act; providing for the scope of this Act; 
providing that this Act does not affect any legal or equitable right or 
remedy otherwise provided by law; defining certain terms; and 
generally relating to the intentional disclosure of sexually explicit 
images. 
Id. 
 176. Id.  “‘Intimate parts’ means the naked genitals, pubic area, or buttocks 
of a person or the naked nipple of a female adult person.”  Id.  “‘Sexual act’ has 
the meaning stated in § 3-301 of this title.”  Id.  “‘Sexual conduct’ has the 
W05_CITRON  (DO NOT DELETE) 5/19/2014  11:01 AM 
2014] CRIMINALIZING REVENGE PORN 373 
such as the exclusion of images related to matters of public interest.  
It reads: 
This section does not apply to: 
(1) a law enforcement official in connection with a criminal 
prosecution; 
(2) a person acting in compliance with a subpoena or court 
order for use in a legal proceeding; 
(3) a person acting with a bona fide and lawful scientific, 
educational, governmental, news, or other similar public 
purpose; or 
(4) a voluntary exposure in a public or commercial setting.177 
The proposed Maryland bill treats nonconsensual pornography as a 
felony with up to five years of jail time and a significant fine. 
Wisconsin has proposed a similar bill.178 
A revenge porn bill proposed by New York lawmakers is 
narrower than New Jersey’s or Maryland’s approach.  It covers 
sexually explicit photographs captured consensually as part of an 
intimate relationship, with the expectation of privacy, and later 
disclosed to the public without the consent of the individual 
depicted.179  Much like the Maryland proposal, the New York 
proposal includes exceptions for law enforcement, legal proceedings, 
and voluntary exposures made in public.180 
California’s newly adopted revenge porn bill has the narrowest 
coverage of all.  Adopted in October 1, 2013, the California law 
provides that a party is guilty of disorderly conduct if 
[a]ny person who photographs or records by any means the 
image of the intimate body part or parts of another identifiable 
person, under circumstances where the parties agree or 
understand that the image shall remain private, and the 
person subsequently distributes the image taken, with the 
intent to cause serious emotional distress, and the depicted 
person suffers serious emotional distress.181 
 
meaning stated in § 3-301 of this title.”  Id.  “‘Image’ includes a photograph, a 
film, a videotape, a recording, or a digital or other reproduction.”  Id. 
 177. Id. 
 178. A.B. 462, 2013–2014 Leg. (Wis. 2013). 
 179. Several different bills on this issue have been proposed in New York. 
One of the authors, Franks, worked on the version sponsored by Assemblyman 
Braunstein and Senator Griffo, which is the bill discussed here. A.O. 8214, 
2013–2014 Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 2013). 
 180. Id. 
 181. CAL. PENAL CODE § 647 (West 2013). 
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The California bill requires that the defendant intend to cause the 
victim serious emotional distress, a requirement that is absent from 
the New Jersey’s bill and other proposals.182  It also demands that 
the state prove that victims have suffered serious emotional 
distress.183  Its penalty is the weakest, comparatively speaking.  
Unlike the New Jersey bill and other proposed bills that classify 
nonconsensual pornography as a felony, it is a misdemeanour in 
California punishable by up to six months in prison and a $1,000 
fine (up to one year in prison and a $2,000 fine for a second 
offense).184 
IV.  THE FIRST AMENDMENT CHALLENGES 
What of First Amendment objections to revenge porn 
legislation?  Would its criminalization transgress First Amendment 
doctrine and free speech values?  Is nonconsensual pornography 
“offensive” speech that must be tolerated or is it instead within the 
narrow band of private communications that can be proscribed 
within the boundaries of the First Amendment?  As we argue in this 
Part, it is the latter. 
A “bedrock principle underlying the First Amendment . . . is 
that the government may not [censor] the expression of an idea 
simply because society finds the idea itself offensive” or 
distasteful.185  Ordinarily, government regulation of the content of 
speech—what speech is about—is permissible only in a narrow set of 
circumstances.  Content regulations have to serve a compelling 
interest that cannot be promoted through less restrictive means.  
Strict scrutiny review, as it is called, is difficult to satisfy because 
we distrust the government to pick winners and losers in the realm 
of ideas.  Courts err on the side of caution before regulating speech 
because free expression is crucial to our ability to govern ourselves, 
to discover the truth, and to express ourselves, among other 
values.186  As the Supreme Court famously declared in New York 
 
 182. Id. 
 183. Id. 
 184. CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 19, 19.2 (West 2008).  Franks worked with 
legislative drafters in California to amend the law to provide more protection 
for victims and to include explicit exceptions for conduct protected by the First 
Amendment. See Sen. Cannella Introduces New Legislation to Combat Revenge 
Porn, ANTHONY CANNELLA (Feb. 20, 2014) http://district12.cssrc.us/content/sen-
cannella-introduces-new-legislation-combat-revenge-porn. 
 185. Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 414 (1989). 
 186. See, e.g., N.Y. Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 269 (1964) (“The 
maintenance of the opportunity for free political discussion to the end that 
government may be responsive to the will of the people and that changes may 
be obtained by lawful means, an opportunity essential to the security of the 
Republic, is a fundamental principle of our constitutional system.” (internal 
quotation marks omitted) (quoting Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359, 369 
(1931)). 
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Times Co. v. Sullivan, our society has a “profound national 
commitment to the principle that debate on public issues should be 
uninhibited, robust, and wide-open.”187  Hateful and deeply offensive 
words thus enjoy presumptive constitutional protection.188 
Nonetheless, First Amendment doctrine holds that not all forms 
of speech regulation are subject to strict scrutiny.  Certain 
categories of speech can be regulated due to their propensity to 
bring about serious harms and only slight contributions to First 
Amendment values. They include true threats, speech integral to 
criminal conduct, defamation, obscenity, and imminent and likely 
incitement of violence.189  Courts also have employed “less rigorous” 
scrutiny in upholding the constitutionality of penalties for 
nonconsensual disclosures of private communications, such as sex 
tapes, on the ground that such communications are not matters of 
public concern.190 
 
 187. Id. at 270. 
 188. In Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971), the Supreme Court 
concluded that the defendant engaged in constitutionally protected speech when 
he wore a jacket into a courtroom with “Fuck the Draft” written on its back.  Id. 
at 16.  The Court explained that a governmental interest in regulating offensive 
speech could not outweigh the defendant’s First Amendment right to freedom of 
speech.  Id. at 26. 
 189. See N.Y. Times Co., 376 U.S. at 269.  The Court has articulated complex 
constitutional standards for some of these categories like defamation, erecting a 
matrix of fault and damage rules based on whether a plaintiff is a public or 
private figure.  Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 346–49 (1974).  As 
free speech scholar Rodney Smolla puts it, the well-defined categories of speech 
falling outside the First Amendment’s coverage entail elaborate standards of 
review, and some constitutional protection is indeed afforded to certain types of 
libelous and obscene speech.  Rodney A. Smolla, Categories, Tiers of Review, and 
the Roiling Sea of Free Speech Doctrine and Principle: A Methodological 
Critique of United States v. Alvarez, 76 ALB. L. REV. 499, 501–02 (2013). 
 190. See, e.g., Michaels v. Internet Entm’t Grp., 5 F. Supp. 2d 823 (C.D. Cal. 
1998). In assessing the constitutionality of certain categories of speech, the 
Supreme Court has distinguished speech involvjng matters of public interest 
and speech involving purely private matters.  See, e.g., Snyder v. Phelps, 131 S. 
Ct. 1207, 1216 (2011) (finding that the constitutionality of intentional infliction 
of emotional distress claims depended on whether the emotionally distressing 
speech involved matters “of interest to society at large” as determined by its 
content, form, and context); City of San Diego v. Roe, 543 U.S. 77, 84 (2004) 
(finding that sexually explicit images were not of legitimate news interest in 
that they did not inform the public about any aspect of his employer’s 
functioning and thus the government could fire an employee without running 
afoul of the First Amendment); Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, 
Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 762 (1985) (upholding a defamation claim because it involved 
a purely private matter of a business’s credit report that was not subject to the 
actual malice standard required for “debate on public issues”); Time v. Hill, 385 
U.S. 374 (1967) (on matters of “legitimate public concern,” defamation claims 
require proof of actual malice); N.Y. Times Co., 376 U.S. at 277 (explaining that 
in a defamation suit involving a public official, free speech on “matters of public 
concern should be uninhibited, robust, and wide open”). 
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A narrowly crafted revenge porn criminal statute that protects 
the privacy of sexually explicit images can be reconciled with the 
First Amendment.  For support, we can look to the Court’s decisions 
assessing the constitutionality of civil penalties under the federal 
Wiretap Act and lower court decisions on the public disclosure of 
private fact tort.  We can rely on those decisions because the Court 
has generally held that the First Amendment rules applicable to 
criminal law are the same as those applicable to tort law.191 
Here it is necessary to take note of the erroneous yet oft-
repeated claim by opponents of criminalization that, while civil 
penalties for revenge porn do not violate the First Amendment, 
criminal penalties do.  This is simply not an accurate statement of 
First Amendment jurisprudence.  The Supreme Court has never 
held that speech protected by the First Amendment can be 
restricted by civil but not criminal law.  In fact, its rulings support 
the opposite conclusion: 
What a State may not constitutionally bring about by means of 
a criminal statute is likewise beyond the reach of its civil 
law . . . .  The fear of damage awards under a rule such as that 
invoked by the Alabama courts here may be markedly more 
inhibiting than the fear of prosecution under a criminal 
statute. . . .  Presumably, a person charged with violation of 
this statute enjoys ordinary criminal-law safeguards such as 
the requirements of an indictment and of proof beyond a 
reasonable doubt.  These safeguards are not available to the 
defendant in a civil action.192 
The Court was explicitly asked to categorically exclude criminal 
penalties for truthful reporting about public officials in Landmark, 
and it explicitly declined to do so.193 
 
 191. N.Y. Times Co., 376 U.S. at 277.  Indeed, as the Court noted in New 
York Times, criminal actions provide even greater protection to defendants than 
do civil cases because they require proof beyond reasonable doubt and other 
protections afforded to criminal defendants.  Id. 
 192. Id. 
 193. Landmark Commc’ns Inc. v. Virginia, 435 U.S. 829, 838 (1978) 
(“Landmark urges as the dispositive answer to the question presented that 
truthful reporting about public officials in connection with their public duties is 
always insulated from the imposition of criminal sanctions by the First 
Amendment. . . .  We find it unnecessary to adopt this categorical approach to 
resolve the issue before us.”); see generally Danielle Citron, Debunking the First 
Amendment Myths Surrounding Revenge Porn Laws, FORBES (Apr. 18, 2014, 
11:19 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/daniellecitron/2014/04/18/debunking-
the-first-amendment-myths-surrounding-revenge-porn-laws/ (debunking the 
myth that the First Amendment has different rules for civil and criminal 
penalties and quoting Eugene Volokh for the proposition that the Court has 
“refused invitations to treat civil liability differently from criminal liability for 
First Amendment purposes”). 
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In other words, to argue that civil restrictions of nonconsensual 
pornography are constitutionally acceptable while criminal 
restrictions are not is logically inconsistent.  While one may take the 
position that criminalization is unwise or unnecessary for policy 
reasons (a position we do not find convincing, as demonstrated 
above), such a position finds no support in established First 
Amendment doctrine.194 
A. Wiretap Decisions 
Let us first explore judicial decisions assessing the 
constitutionality of penalties for the nonconsensual disclosure of 
truthful, lawfully obtained information initially acquired illegally.195  
The Court has held that “state action to punish the publication of 
truthful information seldom can satisfy constitutional standards.”196  
In assessing a newspaper’s criminal conviction for publishing a 
juvenile defendant’s name in a murder case, the Court, in the 1979 
decision in Smith v. Daily Mail,197 laid down the now well-
established rule that “if a newspaper lawfully obtains truthful 
information about a matter of public significance then state officials 
may not constitutionally punish publication of the information, 
absent a need to further a state interest of the highest order.”198  
Since then, the Court has consistently refused to adopt a bright-line 
rule that truthful publications can never be subjected to civil or 
criminal liability for “invading ‘an area of privacy’ defined by the 
State.”199  To the contrary, the Court has repeatedly noted that 
press freedom and privacy rights are both “plainly rooted in the 
traditions and significant concerns of the society.”200   
In Bartnicki v. Vopper,201 for instance, an unidentified person 
intercepted and recorded a cell phone call between the president of a 
local teacher’s union and the union’s chief negotiator.202  The 
conversation concerned the negotiations between the union and the 
 
 194. See Michael Coenen, Of Speech and Sanctions: Toward a Penalty-
Sensitive Approach to the First Amendment, 112 COLUM. L. REV. 991, 994 (2012) 
(“[T]he severity of the penalty imposed—though of central importance to the 
speaker who bears it—does not normally affect the merits of his free speech 
claim. . . .  Speech is either protected, in which case it may not be punished, or 
unprotected, in which case it may be punished to a very great degree.”). 
 195. See, e.g., Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514, 517 (2001); Smith v. Daily 
Mail Pub. Co., 443 U.S. 97, 98 (1979). 
 196. Smith, 443 U.S. at 102; see also Fla. Star v. B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524, 540–
41 (1989) (discussing the high requirements such state action would have to 
meet). 
 197. Smith, 443 U.S. at 98. 
 198. Id. at 103. 
 199. Fla. Star, 491 U.S. at 533. 
 200. Id. 
 201. Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514, 514 (2001). 
 202. Id. at 518. 
W05_CITRON  (DO NOT DELETE) 5/19/2014  11:01 AM 
378 WAKE FOREST LAW REVIEW [Vol. 49 
school board.203  During the call, one of the parties mentioned, 
“go[ing] to . . . [the] homes” of school board members to “blow off 
their front porches.”204  A radio commentator, who received a copy of 
the intercepted call in his mailbox, broadcasted it on his talk 
show.205  The question was whether the radio commentator could be 
penalized under the Wiretap Act for publishing the recorded cell 
phone conversation.206 
As the Court explained, the case presented a “conflict between 
interests of the highest order—on the one hand, the interest in the 
full and free dissemination of information concerning public issues, 
and, on the other hand, the interest in individual privacy and, more 
specifically, in fostering private speech.”207  The Court underscored 
that the “fear of public disclosure of private conversations might 
well have a chilling effect on private speech.”208  For the Court, there 
were free speech interests “on both sides of the constitutional 
calculus.”209  The Court distinguished the free speech interests in 
certain types of communications.  According to the Court, “some 
intrusions on privacy are more offensive than others, and . . . the 
disclosure of the contents of a private conversation can be an even 
greater intrusion on privacy than the interception itself.”210 
The Court struck down the penalties assessed against the radio 
commentator as unconstitutional because the private 
communications concerned negotiations over the proper level of 
compensation for teachers that were “unquestionably a matter of 
public concern.”211  As the Court underscored, Bartnicki did not 
involve the nonconsensual publication of “trade secrets or domestic 
gossip or other information of purely private concern.”212  Citing 
Florida Star v. B.J.F.,213 the Court noted that “[w]e continue to 
believe that the sensitivity and significance of the interests 
presented in clashes between [the] First Amendment and privacy 
rights counsel relying on limited principles that sweep no more 
broadly than the appropriate context of the instant case.”214  The 
Court ruled that the privacy concerns vindicated by the Wiretap Act 
had to “give way” to “the interest in publishing matters of public 
importance.”215  The Court held that even though the journalist 
 
 203. Id. 
 204. Id. at 518–19. 
 205. Id. at 519. 
 206. See id. at 520–21. 
 207. Id. at 518. 
 208. Id. at 533. 
 209. Id. 
 210. Id. 
 211. Id. at 535. 
 212. Id. at 533. 
 213. 491 U.S. 524, 533 (1989). 
 214. Bartnicki, 532 U.S. at 514. 
 215. Id. at 534. 
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knew the conversation had been illegally obtained in violation of the 
federal Wiretap Act, the First Amendment protected its 
broadcast.216 
As the Court suggested in Bartnicki, the state interest in 
protecting the privacy of communications may be “strong enough to 
justify the application of” the federal Wiretap Act if they involve 
matters “of purely private concern.”217  Free speech scholar Neil 
Richards has argued, and we agree, that the Bartnicki rule thus has 
a built-in exception: regulations regarding the nonconsensual 
disclosure of private communications that are not of legitimate 
concern to the public deserve a lower level of First Amendment 
scrutiny.218  Following that reasoning, courts have upheld civil 
penalties under the federal Wiretap Act where the unwanted 
disclosures of private communications involved “purely private 
matters.”219 
B. Public Disclosure of Private Fact Tort 
Along similar lines, lower courts have upheld the 
constitutionality of the public disclosure of private fact tort claims 
where the private facts disclosed did not concern newsworthy 
matters, that is, matters of legitimate public interest.220  The 
constitutionality of the privacy tort in cases involving the 
nonconsensual disclosure of sex videos is well established.221  In 
Michaels v. Internet Entertainment Group, Inc.,222 an adult 
entertainment company obtained a copy of a sex video made by the 
 
 216. Id. at 518. 
 217. Id. at 533. 
 218. Neil M. Richards, The Limits of Tort Privacy, 9 J. ON TELECOMM. & 
HIGH TECH. L. 357, 378 (2011). 
 219. See, e.g., Quigley v. Rosenthal, 327 F.3d 1044, 1067–68 (10th Cir. 2003) 
(upholding civil penalties under the federal Wiretap Act for the disclosure of the 
contents of intercepted phone calls concerning a woman’s private discussion 
with friends and family regarding an ongoing dispute with a neighbor because 
the intercepted call involved purely private matters). 
 220. SOLOVE & SCHWARTZ, supra note 74.  The public disclosure of private 
fact tort builds First Amendment protections into the claim itself by excluding 
from the tort private facts that are newsworthy.  To state a claim for public 
disclosure of private fact, the plaintiff has to prove that the defendant published 
a private fact about the plaintiff that does not involve newsworthy matters and 
whose publication would highly offend the reasonable person.  Citron, supra 
note 112, at 1828–29; William L. Prosser, Privacy, 48 CALIF. L. REV. 383, 394–96 
(1960). 
 221. See, e.g., Michaels v. Internet Entm’t Grp., 5 F. Supp. 2d 823, 839 (C.D. 
Cal. 1998); see also SOLOVE, FUTURE OF REPUTATION, supra note 22, at 129, 160; 
Daniel J. Solove, The Virtues of Knowing Less: Justifying Privacy Protections 
Against Disclosure, 53 DUKE L.J. 967, 987–89 (2003) (arguing that the 
disclosure tort can be balanced with the First Amendment where the speech 
addresses private concerns). 
 222. Michaels, 5 F. Supp. 2d at 828. 
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celebrity couple, Bret Michaels and Pamela Anderson Lee.223  The 
couple sought to enjoin the defendant from publishing the tape on 
the grounds that its publication would mean the commission of the 
tort of public disclosure of private fact.224  The court found for the 
plaintiffs, reasoning that the public has no legitimate interest in 
graphic depictions of the “most intimate aspects of” a celebrity 
couple’s relationship.225  As the court explained, “sexual relations 
are among the most private of private affairs, and that a video 
recording of two individuals engaged in such relations represents 
the deepest possible intrusion into such affairs.”226 
These cases support the constitutionality of narrowly crafted 
revenge porn laws criminalizing the publication of someone’s sexual 
images in violation of their understanding that the images would be 
kept private.  The proposed New York bill and California statute, for 
instance, protect the interest in individual privacy and, in 
particular, the interest in fostering private sexual expression.227  
Sexually themed images constitute psychologically and financially 
harmful breaches of social norms that satisfy the “purely private 
matters” exception in the Smith line of authority.228  As Neil 
Richards puts it, “[u]nwanted publication of a sex video would seem 
to cause much greater injury, and to be far less necessary to public 
debate.”229 
The Court’s recent decision in Snyder v. Phelps230 supports the 
notion that the nonconsensual disclosure of sexual images 
constitutes purely private matters deserving less First Amendment 
protection.231  Snyder concerned the Westboro Baptist Church’s 
picketing of a soldier’s funeral with signs suggesting that the 
soldiers’ deaths are God’s way of punishing the United States for its 
tolerance of homosexuality.232  In 2006, the church’s pastor, Fred 
Phelps, obtained police approval to protest on public land 1,000 feet 
from the church where the funeral of a Marine killed in Iraq, 
Matthew Snyder, would be held.233  The protestors’ signs read, “God 
Hates the USA,” “America is Doomed,” “God Hates You,” “You’re 
Going to Hell,” and “Thank God for Dead Soldiers.”234  Albert Snyder 
 
 223. Id. at 827. 
 224. Id. at 828, 839–40. 
 225. Id. at 840. 
 226. Id. at 841. 
 227. Cf. supra notes 175–80 and accompanying text. 
 228. See Smith v. Daily Mail Pub. Co., 443 U.S. 97, 98 (1979). 
 229. See NEIL M. RICHARDS, INTELLECTUAL PRIVACY: CIVIL LIBERTIES AND 
INFORMATION IN A DIGITAL AGE (forthcoming 2014) (on file with author). 
 230. Snyder v. Phelps, 131 S. Ct. 1207, 1213 (2011). 
 231. Id. at 1220. 
 232. Id. at 1216. 
 233. Id. at 1213. 
 234. Id. 
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sued Phelps and members of his church for intentional infliction of 
emotional distress.235  The jury award was in the millions.236 
The Supreme Court overruled the decision in favor of the 
Westboro Baptist Church.237  As the Chief Justice held, Snyder’s 
emotional distress claim transgressed the First Amendment because 
the protest constituted speech of the highest importance—views on 
public matters like “the political and moral conduct of the United 
States . . . homosexuality in the military, and scandals involving the 
Catholic” Church.238  Chief Justice Roberts, writing for the majority, 
explained that speech on public matters deserves rigorous protection 
in order to prevent the stifling of debate essential to democratic self-
governance.239  In contrast, the Chief Judge explained, speech about 
purely private matters receives less vigorous protection because the 
threat of liability would not risk chilling the “meaningful dialogue of 
ideas.”240  The majority pointed to a government employer’s 
regulation of videos showing an employee engaged in sexual 
activity.241  Such regulation was constitutionally permissible 
because sex videos shed no light on the employer’s operation or 
functionality, but rather involved purely private matters in which 
the public lacked a legitimate interest.242  As the Court noted in 
revealing dicta, sexually explicit images exemplify the sort of 
“purely private matters” that deserve less heightened protection.243 
Some have suggested that United States v. Stevens244 ended the 
question of whether speech can ever be regulated if it falls outside 
the categories of unprotected speech such as defamation, obscenity, 
incitement, or true threats.245  This is a misreading of Stevens.  In 
Stevens, the Court considered the constitutionality of a statute 
 
 235. Id. 
 236. Id. at 1214. 
 237. See generally id. 
 238. Id. at 1217.  The protest’s location further convinced the majority that 
the picketers wanted to engage in a public debate as they protested next to a 
public street, which is traditionally used and specially protected as a forum of 
public assembly and debate.  Id. at 1218–20. 
 239. Id. at 1215–17. 
 240. Id. at 1215. 
 241. Id. at 1215–17. 
 242. Id. 
 243. See id. 
 244. 599 U.S. 460 (2010). 
 245. Oddly, in discussing recognized categories of unprotected speech, the 
Court in Stevens included defamation, citing the group libel case Beauharnais v. 
Illinois, 343 U.S. 250 (1952) for support rather than New York Times Co. v. 
Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964) or later individual defamation cases.  Stevens, 559 
U.S. at 468.  Since the N.Y. Times Co. decision, scholars have long claimed, and 
we tend to agree, that group libel claims would not survive “actual malice” 
scrutiny. Generally, hateful ideas about groups concern matters of public 
concern, as the Court in Snyder suggested.  See generally Snyder, 131 S. Ct. 
1207. 
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criminalizing the creation, sale, or depiction of animal cruelty for 
commercial gain.246  The Court rejected the government’s argument 
that animal cruelty depictions amounted to a new category of 
unprotected speech.247  As the Court explained, First Amendment 
doctrine does not permit the government to prohibit speech just 
because it lacks value or because the “ad hoc calculus of costs and 
benefits tilts in a statute’s favor.”248  The Court does not have 
“freewheeling authority to declare new categories of speech outside 
the scope of the First Amendment.”249  The Court in Stevens, 
however, recognized that some forms of speech may be historically 
unprotected or entitled to less rigorous protection, even though the 
Court has not recognized it as such explicitly.250  But, as the Court 
explained, depictions of animal cruelty are not among them.251  Not 
so for the public disclosure of private fact tort and other long-
standing privacy regulations.  As the Court held in Bartnicki and 
Florida Star, laws protecting privacy are “plainly rooted in the 
traditions and significant concerns of our society.”252 
Moreover, the Court in Snyder v. Phelps, decided after Stevens, 
makes clear that the Court has not eliminated long-standing torts 
like intentional infliction of emotional distress even though the 
Court has not explicitly included it as a category of speech deserving 
of less rigorous protection.253  Although the Court has never 
explicitly held that intentional infliction of emotional distress claims 
amount to a category of protected speech, the decision assumed that 
such claims could be upheld as constitutional if certain conditions 
were met—if the expression giving rise to the claims involved purely 
private matters.254  In Snyder, the Court refused to strike down the 
tort as unconstitutional, much as the Court refused to do so in 
Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell.255  
With this construct in mind, when might revenge porn concern 
speech on public matters deserving rigorous protection?  What about 
the application of revenge porn statutes to individuals publishing 
the sexually explicit images of a public official without the official’s 
consent?   
Consider the infamous images of former Congressman Anthony 
Weiner.  Several women revealed to the press that Congressman 
 
 246. See generally Stevens, 599 U.S. 460. 
 247. Id. at 472. 
 248. Id. at 471. 
 249. Id. at 472. 
 250. See id. at 478–80. 
 251. Id. 
 252. Fla. Star v. B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524, 533 (1989) (internal quotation marks 
omitted) (quoting Cox Broad. Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 491 (1975)); see also 
generally Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514 (2001). 
 253. See supra note 230–43 and accompanying text (discussing Snyder). 
 254. See supra notes 240–43 and accompanying text. 
 255. 485 U.S. 46 (1988). 
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Weiner had sent them sexually explicit photographs of himself via 
text and Twitter messages on different occasions.256  Under the 
reasoning in Snyder, the public arguably has a legitimate interest in 
learning about the sexual indiscretions of governmental 
representatives.  On one occasion, Weiner sent unsolicited images of 
his penis to a college student whom he did not personally know.257  
His decision to send such messages sheds light on the soundness of 
his judgment.  Unlike the typical revenge porn scenario involving 
private individuals who shared their naked photos or permitted 
trusted others to take them on the understanding that the photos 
would remain confidential, this scenario raises important questions 
about whether explicit material disclosed without consent can be 
considered a matter of public import or otherwise constitutionally 
protected. 
The second set of naked images that Congressman Weiner 
shared might have different First Amendment implications.  In 
2013, Congressman Weiner announced that he would be running in 
the New York City mayoral race.258  A woman, Sydney Leathers, 
released sexually explicit images of Weiner that he had sent to her 
while they were having an online affair.259  To be sure, the fact that 
Weiner sent such pictures involves a matter that the public has a 
legitimate interest in learning about, given that Weiner is a public 
figure who had promised that he was no longer engaging in these 
types of extramarital sexual activities.260  But does the public have a 
legitimate interest in the pictures themselves, beyond the question of 
proof that the pictures were authentic? 
In the first scandal, the pictures were proof of a congressman’s 
nonconsensual, potentially harassing conduct vis-à-vis a stranger.  
In the second scandal, Weiner shared naked photographs with a 
trusted intimate.  The public interest lies in the fact that he was 
having an extramarital, online sexual relationship while running for 
public office, a fact that could have been easily demonstrated with 
the numerous text messages exchanged between Weiner and 
Leathers or with censored versions of the pictures in question.  We 
raise this issue not to come down definitely on the matter but to flag 
 
 256.  Kevin Liptak, Weiner Estimates He Sexted Three Women After 
Resigning, CNN POLITICS (July 25, 2013, 1:09 PM), http://politicalticker 
.blogs.cnn.com/2013/07/25/weiner-estimates-he-sexted-three-women-after-
resigning/?iref=allsearch. 
 257. See Weiner Apologizes for Lying, “Terrible Mistakes,” Refuses to Resign, 
CNN POLITICS  (June 7, 2011, 6:54 AM), http://www.cnn.com/2011/POLITICS 
/06/06/new.york.weiner/ [hereinafter Weiner Apology]. 
 258. Cyril Josh Barker, Weiner—Staying in Race, N.Y. AMSTERDAM NEWS, 
July 31, 2013, at 16. 
 259. Id. 
 260. See Weiner Apology supra, note 257. 
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the distinction between the public’s legitimate interest in knowing 
about the naked pictures and in actually seeing them.261 
Another way to understand the constitutionality of revenge 
porn statutes is through the lens of confidentiality law.  
Confidentiality regulations are less troubling from a First 
Amendment perspective because they penalize the breach of an 
assumed duty, not the emotional injury of published words.  Instead 
of prohibiting a certain kind of speech, confidentiality law enforces 
express or implied promises and shared expectations.262 
C. Obscenity 
Might the Supreme Court find that nonconsensual pornography 
amounts to unprotected obscenity?  Noted First Amendment scholar 
Eugene Volokh argues that sexually intimate images of individuals 
disclosed without consent belong to the category of “obscenity,” 
which the Supreme Court has determined does not receive First 
Amendment protection.263  In his view, nonconsensual pornography 
lacks First Amendment value as a historical matter and should be 
understood as categorically unprotected because it is obscenity.264  
Although the Court’s obscenity doctrine has developed along 
different lines with distinct justifications, nonconsensual 
pornography can be seen as part of obscenity’s long tradition of 
proscription. 
In Miller v. California,265 the Court set out the following 
guidelines for determining whether material is obscene:  
whether ‘the average person, applying contemporary 
community standards’ would find that the work, taken as a 
whole, appeals to the prurient interest, (b) whether the work 
depicts or describes, in a patently offensive way, sexual 
conduct specifically defined by the applicable state law, and (c) 
whether the work, taken as a whole, lacks serious literary, 
artistic, political, or scientific value.266 
 
 261. In his forthcoming book, Neil Richards makes a similar argument.  See 
RICHARDS, supra note 229, at 38.  In discussing the case of celebrities who did 
not consent to sex tapes being made public, Richards argues that naming 
celebrities as adulterers may be one thing but publishing high-resolution videos 
of their sex acts is another.  Id.  As he explains, we do not need to see celebrities 
naked to discuss their infidelity.  Id. 
 262. Daniel J. Solove & Neil M. Richards, Rethinking Free Speech and Civil 
Liability, 109 COLUM. L. REV. 1650, 1670 (2009). 
 263. Eugene Volokh, Florida “Revenge Porn” Bill, VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (Apr. 
10, 2013, 7:51 PM), http://www.volokh.com/2013/04/10/florida-revenge-porn-
bill/. 
 264. Id. 
 265. 413 U.S. 15 (1973). 
 266. Id. at 24 (citations omitted). 
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The Supreme Court provided two “plain examples” of “sexual 
conduct” that could be regulated: “[p]atently offensive 
representations or descriptions of ultimate sexual acts, normal or 
perverted, actual or simulated” and “[p]atently offensive 
representation or descriptions of masturbation, excretory functions, 
and lewd exhibition of the genitals.267 
Disclosing pictures and videos that expose an individual’s 
genitals or reveal an individual engaging in a sexual act without 
that individual’s consent could qualify as a “patently offensive 
representation” of sexual conduct.  Such material offers no “serious 
literary, artistic, political, or scientific value.”268 
D. Free Speech Values 
Free expression allows individuals to express truths about 
themselves and the world as they see it.269  It enables citizens to 
make intelligent, informed decisions about self-government.270  As 
Justice Brandeis underscored, free speech is “important not just as 
an individual right, but as a safeguard for the social processes of 
democracy.”271  Being able to express ideas and to listen to the ideas 
of others is instrumental to our ability to engage as citizens. 
The nonconsensual disclosure of someone’s sexually explicit 
images does little to advance expressive autonomy and self-
governance and does much to undermine private self-expression.  
Maintaining the confidentiality of someone’s sexually explicit 
images, shared under the assumption that they would be kept 
private, has little impact on a poster’s expression of ideas.  It 
contributes little to public conversation essential for self-
government.  The publication of revenge porn does not produce 
better democratic citizens.  It does not promote civic character or 
educate us about cultural, religious, or political issues. 
Instead, the nonconsensual disclosure of a person’s sexually 
explicit images chills private expression based on the fear that the 
images would be shared with the public at large.  Without any 
expectation of privacy and confidentiality, victims would not share 
their naked images.  Such sharing may in fact enhance intimacy 
 
 267. Id. at 25. 
 268. Id. at 24.  Volokh has written that: 
[A] suitably clear and narrow statute banning nonconsensual 
posting of nude pictures of another, in a context where there’s 
good reason to think that the subject did not consent to 
publication of such pictures, would likely be upheld by the 
courts . . . .  [C]ourts can rightly conclude that as a categorical 
matter such nude pictures indeed lack First Amendment value. 
Volokh, supra note 263. 
 269. Citron, supra note 94, at 101 & n.286 (citing LAURENCE H. TRIBE, 
AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 785–89 (2d ed. 1988)). 
 270. RICHARDS, supra note 229, at 8–9. 
 271. Id. 
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among couples and their willingness to be forthright in other aspects 
of their relationship.  Laws restricting disclosure of private 
information serve important speech-enhancing functions.  In his 
concurrence in Bartnicki, Justice Breyer noted that while 
nondisclosure laws place “direct restrictions on speech, the Federal 
Constitution must tolerate laws of this kind because of the 
importance of these privacy and speech-related objectives,”272 that 
is, the interest in “fostering private speech.”273  He continued, [T]he 
Constitution permits legislatures to respond flexibly to the 
challenges future technology may pose to the individual’s interest in 
basic personal privacy . . . .  [W]e should avoid adopting overly broad 
or rigid constitutional rules, which would unnecessarily restrict 
legislative flexibility.”274  We agree. 
V.  RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
In this Part, we offer our recommendations to lawmakers 
working to criminalize revenge porn.  Our advice is informed by 
First Amendment doctrine, due process concerns, and the goal of 
encouraging the passage of laws that will deter revenge porn and its 
grave harms.  In the course of advising lawmakers working on this 
issue, we have worked closely with civil liberties groups, including 
the ACLU.  We take their recommendations and concerns seriously.  
Our recommendations are offered in that spirit. 
Civil liberties groups rightly worry that if revenge porn laws 
“aren’t narrowly focused enough, they can be interpreted too 
broadly.”275  Digital Media Law Project’s Jeff Hermes has expressed 
concern that revenge porn laws might criminalize speech in which 
the public has a legitimate interest. 
Careful and precise drafting can avoid these concerns.  These 
drafting techniques are essential to any effort to criminalize revenge 
porn.276  Criminal laws are vulnerable to constitutional challenges if 
they are vague or overbroad.  Defendants must have clear notice 
about the precise activity that is prohibited.  Not only does 
legislation have to give fair warning to potential perpetrators, it 
must not be so broad as to criminalize innocuous behavior.  Let us 
explore key features of revenge porn bills that can help avoid these 
problems. 
 
 272. Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514, 537–38 (2001) (Breyer, J., 
concurring). 
 273. Id. at 536. 
 274. Id. at 541. 
 275. Anne Flaherty, “Revenge Porn” Victims Press for New Laws, 
ASSOCIATED PRESS (Nov. 15, 2013, 12:34 PM), http://bigstory.ap.org/article 
/revenge-porn-victims-press-new-laws. 
 276. This necessary care is not limited to revenge porn; any law that 
regulates expression faces similar challenges. 
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A. Clarifying the Mens Rea 
Revenge porn laws should clarify the defendant’s mental state.  
They could require that the defendant knowingly betrayed the 
privacy expectation of the person in the sexually explicit image.277  If 
that were required, a law could require proof that the defendant 
knew that the other person did not consent to the disclosure and 
that the other person shared the image (or permitted the image to 
be taken) on the understanding it would be kept private.278 
The California law seemingly incorporates this notion.  The law 
only punishes intentional privacy invaders.279  It does not apply to 
individuals who foolishly share someone’s naked photos with others 
without knowing they are breaching someone’s confidence.  The 
current California statute only applies “under circumstances where 
the parties agree or understand the image shall remain private.”280  
It would not reach people who repost nude images without 
knowledge or agreement that the image be kept private. 
B. Malicious Motive 
The California bill goes too far, in our view, in requiring proof of 
a malicious motive, specifically that the defendants intended to 
inflict serious emotional distress.  Other statutes have imposed 
similar “intent to harass” or “intent to harm” requirements.281  Such 
requirements misunderstand the gravamen of the wrong—the 
disclosure of someone’s naked photographs without the person’s 
consent and in violation of their expectation that the image be kept 
private.  Whether the person making the disclosure is motivated by 
a desire to harm a particular person, as opposed to a desire to 
entertain or generate profit, should be irrelevant.  Malicious motive 
requirements are not demanded by the First Amendment and, in 
fact, create an unprincipled and indefensible hierarchy of 
perpetrators.  What is essential is a statute’s goal of protecting 
privacy, autonomy, and the fostering of private expression, which 
the Court has recognized as legitimate grounds for regulation.282 
 
 277. Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147, 152–55 (1959) (ruling in an obscenity 
case that the mens rea of the crime must be “knowing” rather than mere 
negligence to protect against overbreadth concerns). 
 278. That is the view of one of us (Citron).  Franks would frame the mens 
rea requirement for the lack of consent element to use a “knowing or should 
have known” standard. 
 279. We borrow this phrase from Lee Rowland, who generously spent time 
talking to one of us (Citron) about the constitutionality of revenge porn 
legislation. 
 280. CAL. PENAL CODE § 247 (West 2013). 
 281. See, e.g., id. § 647. 
 282. See supra notes 272–74 and accompanying text. 
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C. Proof of Harm 
Revenge porn statutes might have a better chance of 
withstanding overbreadth challenges if they require the state to 
prove that the victims suffered harm.  For instance, the California 
bill requires the State to prove that the victim suffered emotional 
harm.  Lawmakers could extend coverage to other types of serious 
harms described in Part I, such as economic injuries, physical harm, 
or stalking.  Free speech advocates contend that revenge porn 
statutes should not criminalize postings that have no impact on 
victims.  That argument certainly should be considered as 
lawmakers work on revenge porn bills.283 
D. Clear Exemptions 
Revenge porn bills should include exemptions that guard 
against the criminalization of disclosures concerning matters of 
public interest, such as the Maryland, New York, and Wisconsin 
bills do.284  They should make clear that it is a crime to distribute 
someone’s sexually explicit images if and only if those images do not 
concern matters of public importance.  Worded that way, a law 
would not apply, for example, to Syndey Leathers, the woman who 
published former Congressman and mayoral candidate Anthony 
Weiner’s intimate pictures.  Such an exception would help reflect 
the state of First Amendment doctrine; it would not alleviate 
overbreadth problems. 
E. Specific Definitions 
Revenge porn statutes must provide clear and specific 
definitions of certain key terms.  For instance, legislators have 
provided specific and narrow definitions of “sexually explicit” and 
“nude” images so that defendants have a clear understanding of the 
images covered by the statutes.  Maryland, New Jersey, and 
California include narrow definitions of “sexually explicit” and 
“nude” images. 
Revenge porn bills should also clarify what lawmakers mean by 
“disclosure.”  Disclosure could mean showing a single other person, 
such as sharing a cell phone photograph with another person or 
sending a person’s nude photograph to her employer.  It could, 
however, have a more narrow meaning: publicity to a wide audience.  
We believe that a broader definition is in order, since nonconsensual 
pornography can have a devastating impact if shown to one other 
 
 283. On this point we may be at odds. Franks disagrees that proof of harm 
should be an essential component of a revenge porn bill, as no such similar 
component seems to be required by other forms of sexual surveillance or 
abuse.  Citron believes that such proof may be required to overcome 
overbreadth concerns. 
 284. See supra notes 175–80 and accompanying text. 
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person.  Victims have lost their jobs after perpetrators e-mailed 
their nude photos to their employers.  They experience great shame 
knowing that an employer or client has seen their nude photo 
without their consent.  The harms of revenge porn can be as 
powerful if seen by one person as by hundreds. 
F. Penalty 
The ideal penalty for nonconsensual pornography is another 
contested issue.  If the conduct is categorized as a mere 
misdemeanor, it risks sending the message that the harm caused to 
victims is not that severe.  Such categorization also decreases 
incentives for law enforcement to dedicate the resources necessary 
to adequately investigate such conduct.  At the same time, criminal 
laws that are more punitive will face stricter examination and 
possible public resistance.  Although California’s categorization of 
revenge porn as a misdemeanor sends a weak message to would-be 
perpetrators and will be a less effective deterrent than a law like 
New Jersey’s,285 it may have aided the law’s passage. 
On March 26, 2014, Congresswoman Jackie Speier (D-CA) 
announced that she would be sponsoring criminal legislation against 
nonconsensual pornography.286  We support the federal criminal 
prohibition of nonconsensual pornography because it would reach 
online acts that are not covered by state law.287  Congress could 
amend the federal cyber-stalking statute, § 2261A, with the features 
we suggested above in mind.288 
Such a law would not weaken § 230 protections by exposing 
search engines, Internet service providers (“ISPs”), and most content 
hosts to potential liability.  A law drafted as we suggest would not 
involve any alteration of § 230, nor would it target most online 
platforms.  It would only prohibit the disclosure of someone’s 
sexually explicit images if the defendant had the requisite mens rea.  
The law is, in this and other respects, in harmony with the goals of § 
230, which distinguishes between interactive computer services and 
information content providers.  It is true that Internet 
 
 285. The ACLU initially objected to the California bill and then withdrew its 
opposition on the grounds that the statute was sufficiently narrow to comport 
with the First Amendment. 
 286. One of us (Franks) is assisting Rep. Speier’s office in drafting the 
federal legislation. Steven Nelson, Federal “Revenge Porn” Bill Will Seek to 
Shrivel Booming Internet Fad, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., (Mar. 26, 2014), 
http://www.usnews.com/news/articles/2014/03/26/federal-revenge-porn-bill-will-
seek-to-shrivel-booming-internet-fad. 
 287. The U.S. Constitution permits federal lawmakers to regulate the 
instrumentalities of interstate commerce, including the Internet. 
 288. See Mary Anne Franks, Why We Need a Federal Criminal Law 
Response to Revenge Porn, CONCURRING OPINIONS (Feb. 15, 2013), 
http://www.concurringopinions.com/archives/2013/02/why-we-need-a-federal-
criminal-law-response-to-revenge-porn.html. 
W05_CITRON  (DO NOT DELETE) 5/19/2014  11:01 AM 
390 WAKE FOREST LAW REVIEW [Vol. 49 
intermediaries would not be able to raise a § 230 defense in the 
unlikely event of prosecution, but this would not mean that they 
could not raise any other, more relevant defenses. 
If nonconsensual pornography were to become a federal crime, it 
would be one of thousands of existing federal crimes for which no 
Internet entity can raise a § 230 defense.  Search engines and ISPs 
have had to work around federal criminal law for many years now, 
and this fact has not resulted in anything approaching the “death” of 
the Internet or of the free exchange of ideas. 
Federal criminalization of certain forms of online content, far 
from becoming a burden for search engines, ISPs, and other entities 
providing interactive computer services, can actually lead to 
important and voluntary innovations by signaling the seriousness of 
the damage caused to victims.  Google and Microsoft’s recent efforts 
with regard to child pornography are an admirable case in point.289 
CONCLUSION 
We write this Article at a time of great possibility for the 
criminalization of nonconsensual pornography.  On October 12, 
2013, the New York Times editorial board endorsed our efforts as 
Board Members of the Cyber Civil Rights Initiative in helping 
legislators craft criminal prohibitions of revenge porn.290  As the 
editorial board urged, “Although lawmakers can’t do much to help 
their constituents with these difficulties, they can work to provide 
recourse for when exes seek revenge through un-consensual 
pornography.”291  States, along with the federal government, should 
craft narrow statutes that prohibit the publication of nonconsensual 
pornography.  Such efforts are indispensable for victims whose lives 
are upended by images they shared or permitted to be taken on the 
understanding that they would remain confidential.  No one should 
be able to turn others into objects of pornography without their 
consent.  Doing so ought to be a criminal act.  In this Article, we 
have laid out why this is the case, offered our assessment of recent 
legislative proposals, and addressed First Amendment concerns.  We 
 
 289. Alanna Petroff, Google, Microsoft Move to Block Child Porn, 
CNNMONEY (Nov. 18, 2013, 9:10 AM), http://money.cnn.com/2013/11/18 
/technology/google-microsoft-child-porn/. 
 290. Editorial, Fighting Back Against Revenge Porn, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 13, 
2013, at SR10. The Chicago Tribune editorial board expressed a similar view: 
“The First Amendment can coexist fine with laws against revenge porn—as it 
does with laws against child porn, incitements to violence and sexual 
harassment.”  Sordid Revenge: Using Explicit Photos to Embarrass Should Be a 
Crime, CHI. TRIB., (Feb. 2, 2014), http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2014-02-
02/opinion/ct-revenge-porn-edit-0202-20140202_1_mary-anne-franks-explicit-
photos-sexual-images. 
 291. Id. 
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hope, in time, to see lawmakers follow our advice and ensure the 
protection of victims. 
